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REGULATORY MALFUNCTIONS IN THE
DRUG PATENT ECOSYSTEM
Ana Santos Rutschman*

ABSTRACT
Patent protection for several of the world’s best-selling and most promising
drugs—biologics—has begun waning. Over the next few years, many other
drugs in this category will lose critical patent protection. In principle, this
should open the United States market to competition, as more manufacturers are
now able to produce relatively cheaper versions of these expensive drugs, known
as biosimilars. That, however, has not been the case. This Article examines this
problem in the context of the articulation between anticompetitive behaviors and
regulatory interventions in the biopharmaceutical arena and argues for a novel
solution: a timelier response provided by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the form of license revocation when follow-on
innovators fail to compete.
In one significant case, the FDA approved several biosimilar versions from
different manufacturers that would in principle compete with the biologic drug
Humira—the largest-grossing drug in the United States and worldwide—but the
manufacturer of Humira entered into multiple agreements with biosimilar
manufacturers to keep the drug out of the U.S. market until 2023, while making
it available elsewhere from 2018 onward.
An abundant stream of scholarship has examined the relationship between
pharmaceutical markets and antitrust mechanisms to curb anticompetitive
behaviors. This Article moves the debate in a new direction. Because antitrust
responses generally face a time lag, this Article posits that an additional
regulatory intervention is needed outside antitrust law, and it argues that the
FDA is institutionally well-placed to provide a first-line checkpoint for
anticompetitive agreements that result in non-commercialization of approved
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drugs. While novel, this proposal incorporates a solution that has been hiding
in plain sight: the FDA regulatory framework allows the Agency to revoke
licenses under certain circumstances, including some forms of inaction on the
part of the licensee. This Article shows that the FDA not only has the authority,
but also the statutory obligation, to revoke the licenses of biosimilar
manufacturers who deliberately fail to bring their products to market within a
reasonable period of time.
Many of the biologics slated to lose patent protection in the first half of the
2020s are routinely used in the treatment of some of the most challenging
medical conditions, including certain cancers and auto-immune diseases. At a
time when concerns over drug prices are at the forefront of political and social
debates, finding ways to instill competition into post-patent markets remains a
crucial task. The solution put forth in this Article furthers the interests of
different parties, as it clears the pathway for motivated biosimilar
manufacturers to bring their products to a profitable market while bringing
down overall costs for health systems and, in particular, for patients in need of
extremely expensive pharmaceuticals.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a patient in need of a pharmaceutical drug with an annual price tag
of $40,000 to $50,000. This drug is a biologic, a category of structurally complex
drugs targeting a broad range of serious medical conditions, from certain cancers
to inflammatory diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn’s disease.1 As
dozens of patents begin expiring—including the most relevant patent, covering
the drug’s composition—competitors gear up to manufacture versions of the
drug, which are subsequently reviewed and approved by the competent
regulatory agency and may therefore enter the market.
Now consider a possible bifurcation in this story. In one market, the followon versions2 of the biologic become commercially available shortly after the
composition patent expires. Prices go down by roughly 25%. In some places
within this market, the savings to the patient are as modest as 10%, while in
others they reach up to 80%, even though the latter number occurs very
infrequently.3 Even if annual savings are on the lower end of the spectrum at
10%, our hypothetical patient is still spending $4,000 to $5,000 less than before
patent expiration. If savings reach the average 25%, our patient saves between
$10,000 and $12,500. In the rare scenario of an 80% reduction, savings can reach
between $32,000 and $40,000.
In a different market with similar economic characteristics, follow-on
versions of the biologic are also developed, and several receive approval from
the regulatory agency in charge of reviewing pharmaceutical products, but none
comes to market. Instead, and amidst patent litigation concerning the secondary
patents associated with the reference biologic drug, all the manufacturers of the
follow-on products enter into agreements with the manufacturer of the biologic.
All patent litigation comes to an end, in exchange for access to a foreign market.
The manufacturers of the follow-on biologic start selling their product abroad
under a multi-competitor regime. In the domestic market, with only the reference

1
The Public Health Service Act, which regulates the approval of biologics, biosimilars, and
interchangeable drugs, defines “biological product” as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine,
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or
derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1).
2
Follow-on products are cheaper versions of previously approved pharmaceutical drugs, as is the case
of generics. In the field of biologics, their follow-on counterparts are known as biosimilars. See infra Part II; see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(i)(2)–(3) (defining biosimilars and interchangeable products).
3
See Susan Ladika, Bringing Humira (Its Price) Down a Peg, MANAGED CARE 7, 8 (Jan. 2019),
https://lsc-pagepro.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/frame.php?i=565820&p=&pn=&ver=html5&view=
contentsBrowser.
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biologic available to patients, prices do not go down. In fact, the single
manufacturer on the market promptly raises the price of the biologic after the
expiration of the composition patent by around 10%, as it had been doing before
patent expiration. Because each agreement lasts between four to five years, our
patient will likely have no access to a cheaper drug for a protracted period of
time, even though it is available to patients in a similar market.
As the reader might have guessed, our patient is not so hypothetical. The
market in which no competition occurs is the United States. The foreign market
is Europe. The biopharmaceutical drug is Humira, the world’s best-selling drug
since 2012.4 While follow-on versions of Humira—called biosimilars—have
been entering the European market since 2018,5 no such thing has happened west
of the Atlantic. The same manufacturers that commercialize biosimilars to
Humira in Europe have agreed not to sell them in the United States,6 even though
Humira’s composition patent expired December 31, 2016, in the United States,
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or “Agency”) approved the first of
these biosimilars in September 2016.7 Per the terms of the agreements,
biosimilars to Humira will not be commercially available in the United States
until 2023.8 In exchange, the manufacturer of Humira has ended all litigation—
and threat thereof—involving Humira’s vast secondary patent estate, in which
several patents have already been successfully challenged and invalidated by
biosimilar companies.9
4
Andrew Humphreys, Top 200 Medicines Annual Report 2019: The King of Medicines, PHARMA LIVE
(Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.pharmalive.com/top-200-medicines-annual-report-2019-the-king-of-medicines/.
5
See Dominic Tyer, 2018 in Review: Humira Biosimilars Arrive in Europe, PHARMAPHORUM (Dec. 20,
2018), https://pharmaphorum.com/views-analysis-sales-marketing/2018-review-humira-biosimilars-europe/;
Arlene Weintraub, Humira Biosimilars Catch Fire in Europe and Could Take Half the Market in a Year,
FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/humira-biosimilars-catch-fire-europeand-could-take-half-market-a-year-report.
6
See Andrew Dunn, With Boehringer Settlement, AbbVie Completes Humira Sweep, BIOPHARMA DIVE
(May 14, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/abbvie-boehringer-ingelheim-settle-humira-patentbiosimilar/554729/.
7
FDA Approves Amgen’s AMJEVITA™ (Adalimumab-Atto) for Treatment of Seven Inflammatory
Diseases, AMGEN (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.amgen.com/media/news-releases/2016/09/fda-approvesamgens-amjevita-adalimumabatto-for-treatment-of-seven-inflammatory-diseases/; see also infra Appendix 2
(listing all FDA approvals and pay-for-delay settlements involving biosimilars to Humira in the United States).
8
See, e.g., Suzanne Elvidge, AbbVie Nets 7th Humira Biosimilar Deal, Pushing Pfizer Entry to 2023,
BIOPHARMA DIVE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/abbvie-nets-7th-humira-biosimilardeal-pushing-pfizer-entry-to-2023/543459/; Eric Sagonowsky, Boehringer Buckles in AbbVie Patent Fight,
Saving Humira from Biosims Until 2023, FIERCEPHARMA (May 14, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma/boehringer-deal-abbvie-s-megablockbuster-u-s-market-for-humira-looks-safe-until-2023.
9
See, e.g., Ned Pagliarulo, Coherus Wins Humira Patent Ruling, Chipping Away at AbbVie’s Defenses,
FIERCEPHARMA (May 17, 2017), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coherus-humira-patent-abbvie-iprbiosimilar/442950/; Jan Wolfe, PTAB Sides with Boehringer in Challenge to Humira Patent, REUTERS (July 7,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/ip-patent-boehringer/ptab-sides-with-boehringer-in-challenge-to-
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Biologics like Humira consist of large, structurally complex molecules, as
opposed to small-molecule drugs, which still form the bulk of pharmaceutical
drugs available to patients.10 They are made of living organisms11 and “produced
by biotechnology methods and other cutting-edge technologies.”12 Their
complexity renders them difficult and expensive to develop, as well as hard to
replicate.13 Importantly, many biologics are among the most promising and
needed biopharmaceutical products around the world.14 By extension, they are
also extremely pricey and profitable.15 While Humira and other biologics like
breast cancer-treating Herceptin have a price tag between $50,000 and
$70,000,16 a wave of newer-generation biologics recently entered the United
States market at prices in the six and seven digits.17
Agreements between pharmaceutical companies, seeking to delay market
entrance of profitable drugs, are not new. The phenomenon first appeared in the
context of small-molecule drugs18 and became known as “reverse payment” or
“pay-for-delay” settlements.19 These agreements first came to the attention of

humira-patent-idUSL1N1JY1U8.
10
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and
Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016).
11
See Ian Haydon, Biologics: The Pricey Drugs Transforming Medicine, CONVERSATION (July 26, 2017),
https://theconversation.com/biologics-the-pricey-drugs-transforming-medicine-80258.
12
What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter What Are
“Biologics”],
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-arebiologics-questions-and-answers (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
13
See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2018).
14
See Haydon, supra note 11; see also infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Part III.A.
16
See, e.g., Richard Staines, FDA Approves Herceptin Biosimilar as U.S. Patent Expires,
PHARMAPHORUM (Jun. 14, 2019), https://pharmaphorum.com/news/fda-approves-herceptin-biosimilar-as-uspatent-expires/; Tracy Staton, FDA Approves Roche’s Pricey New Herceptin Partner, Perjeta, FIERCEPHARMA
(June 11, 2012, 10:12 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/regulatory/fda-approves-roche-s-pricey-newherceptin-partner-perjeta.
17
See, e.g., Denise Roland, At $2 Million, New Novartis Drug Is Priciest Ever, WALL ST. J. (May 24,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-2-million-new-novartis-drug-is-priciest-ever-11558731506 (reporting
FDA approval of Zolgensma, a gene therapy targeting a rare genetic condition known as spinal muscular
atrophy).
18
This category includes drugs like aspirin, Prozac, and Lipitor (a drug treating high cholesterol levels).
See Fuxing Liu, Lihong Peng, Geng Tian, Jialiang Yang, Hui Chen, Qi Hu, Xiaojun Liu & Liqian Zhou,
Identifying Small Molecule-miRNA Associations Based on Credible Negative Sample Selection and Random
Walk, 8 FRONTIERS BIOENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fbioe.2020.00131/full (defining small molecule drugs).
19
See, e.g., Carrier & Minniti, supra note 13, at 1.
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1998,20 and in 2013 the Supreme Court
ruled in Actavis that pay-for-delay was subject to antitrust scrutiny.21
The trigger for these agreements is often the impending expiration of the
core patent or patents covering a financially profitable drug. Unlike conventional
drugs, which on average were protected by fewer than five patents,22 biologics
are protected by large patent estates.23 The manufacturer of Humira, for instance,
applied for over 200 patents in the United States, and was granted over 100.24
Typically, as the most relevant patents covering a drug begin expiring—or are
invalidated—follow-on competitors start taking steps to produce and obtain
FDA approval to market a generic version (in the case of small-molecule drugs)
or a biosimilar version (in the case of biologics)25 of the reference product.
Twice before, around 2001 and 2011, several pharmaceutical products faced en
masse patent expirations occurring within a short period of time.26 This thinning
out of patent protection is often referred to as a “patent cliff,” particularly within
the pharmaceutical industry.27
The 2001 and 2011 waves of patent expirations affected best-selling drugs
like Prozac and Lipitor,28 whose revenue streams plummeted as soon as generic
manufacturers were able to bring their products to market.29 Confronted with the
20
U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMPETITION POLICY
AND CONSUMER RIGHTS ON PAY-FOR-DELAY DEALS: LIMITING COMPETITION AND COSTING CONSUMERS 2 (July
23, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 FTC STATEMENT].
21
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 137 (2013); see infra Part III.B.
22
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
23
See infra Part III.A (describing how the average number of patents covering a single drug has climbed
from the single digits to the dozens and, in some cases, to the hundreds).
24
See infra Part III.A (presenting a case study on Humira); see also infra Appendix 1 (describing the
current Humira patent estate).
25
In addition to biosimilars, follow-on biologics also encompass “interchangeable products.” See 42
U.S.C. § 262(i)(3). To date, however, no interchangeable product has gained FDA approval. See generally Yaniv
Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113 (2018) (describing systemic
flaws in the regulatory pathway for the review and approval of follow-on biologics).
26
See infra Part I.B.1.
27
As seen in Part I, thinning out of patent protection should in principle enable follow-on competitors to
enter the market. However, gamesmanship of regulatory regimes can be used to artificially keep competitors at
bay, as detailed in Part III. In some areas outside of legal scholarship, and particularly among industry
commentators, the expression “patent cliff” is often used to emphasize the economic loss to patent holders
brought about by the expiration of core patents on a drug, an emphasis not adopted here. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Doughman, Impending Patent Cliff Threatens Billions of Global Prescription Drug Sales, PHARMA PROCESSING
WORLD (June 6, 2019), https://www.pharmaceuticalprocessingworld.com/impending-patent-cliff-threatensbillions-of-global-prescription-drug-sales/.
28
See infra Part I.B.1 (describing the first and second wave of patent expirations across the
pharmaceutical industry).
29
See infra Part I.B.1. Notice that post-patent decline of revenue is a consequence of the mechanics of
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prospect of sudden and sharply declining revenue, innovator companies began
entering into pay-for-delay agreements with follow-on manufacturers, a scenario
that is virtually identical to the hypothetical presented above, as well as to the
agreements between the manufacturer of Humira and the biosimilar
manufacturers preparing to take advantage of the thinning out of Humira’s
patent estate.
There is, however, an important distinction between the previous instances
of temporally concentrated patent expirations across the pharmaceutical industry
and the landscape of which Humira is a part. These waves of patent expirations
affected small-molecule drugs. The ongoing wave of patent expirations is the
first to affect biologics. Recall that these are not only the most cutting-edge
products available to patients, but they also treat especially serious medical
conditions. The social and economic impact of the ongoing wave is markedly
different from previous waves.30 The consequences of agreements delaying
market entrance of biologics are of much larger magnitude to the health of
individuals and to health systems as a whole than before.31 Moreover, the
regulatory pathway that enables the approval and commercialization of
biosimilars is relatively recent and, according to several commentators, poorly
designed and prone to gaming.32 These combined characteristics should make
regulators, policy makers, interest groups, and legal commentators particularly
concerned with anticompetitive behaviors involving biologic products.
The first signs of a contractual agreement resulting in the delay of
competition between an original and follow-on biologic date back to 2016 and
involved biologic drug Humira.33 That same year, the FDA approved the first
Humira biosimilar. But, even though no biosimilars actually entered the market
in the United States, it was not until 2019 that the first lawsuits were brought
against the manufacturer of Humira and the biosimilar manufacturers potentially
competing with it.34 Unless a legal intervention changes this landscape, there
will be no biosimilar competition in the United States until 2023—five years
after the first biosimilar to Humira entered the European market, and six years
patent law, and a natural consequence of loss of market exclusivity. Gamesmanship of regulatory regimes,
however, has enabled some players in the pharmaceutical patent ecosystem to artificially prolong market
exclusivity by amassing abnormally large numbers of staggered patents while entering into agreements to restrict
competition with generic or biosimilar manufacturers. See infra Part III.
30
See infra Part I.B.1.
31
See infra Part III.
32
See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 13, at 34. See generally Heled, supra note 25 (discussing
unsuccessful efforts to instill competition into biologics markets).
33
See infra Part III.
34
See infra Part III.A.4.
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after that same biosimilar was approved by the FDA for commercialization in
the United States.35
The legal interventions associated with anticompetitive behaviors of the type
described above belong traditionally to the domain of antitrust law and policy.
However, antitrust responses tend to lag in time, as exemplified in the case of
Humira. While pay-for-delay can be configured as a core antitrust problem,36
this does not mean that antitrust law and antitrust regulators are or should be the
sole entities capable of addressing anticompetitive behaviors in the
biopharmaceutical arena. This Article explores the possibility of a more
immediate response to problems posed by pay-for-delay in the context of
biologics than the one that antitrust regulators like the FTC, or the application
of antitrust law, can provide.
Because anticompetitive behaviors related to biopharmaceutical products
arise in a “shared regulatory space,”37 it is worth asking if there are any other
institutional players that are well placed to address pay-for-delay, without
deviating from their mission and without interfering with unfolding, however
slow, antitrust responses.
This Article answers that question by identifying the FDA as the natural
locus for an intervention that would curb pay-for-delay and incentivize
motivated biosimilar manufacturers to bring their products to market. Known as
an institutional catalyst for the production of information and as a player in the
administration of innovation policy,38 the FDA acts also as the gatekeeper for
biopharmaceutical products. In cases of pay-for-delay, a biopharmaceutical
company elects to deliberately remain outside the market, going against the
permissive gesture of the administrative agency approving a product at the
request of that same company.
While it is a prerogative of the private company to refrain from
commercializing its products, it is also a prerogative of the agency to withdraw
approval if no manufacturing activity occurs within a reasonable period of
time.39 In fact, after examining the regulatory framework for license revocation,

35

See infra Part III.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 3
ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 749 (2011).
37
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1131, 1134 (2012) (noting that “[m]any areas of regulation and administration are characterized by
fragmented and overlapping delegations of power to administrative agencies”).
38
See infra Part IV.
39
See infra Part IV.
36
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this Article argues that the FDA has not only the ability, but also the obligation,
to revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-delay.
From a policy perspective, it is also desirable that the Agency do so. This
solution eliminates some of the most troubling effects of the extended lag
between anticompetitive settlements and antitrust litigation while triaging the
marketplace for biosimilar competition.40 On the one hand, highly motivated
players—in a field encompassing the most expensive drugs41 in the world—will
seek regulatory approval from the FDA if they intend to come to market. On the
other, players unwilling to engage in patent litigation, or motivated primarily by
the prospect of pay-for-delay, are now discouraged from (mis)using the
regulatory pathway and will reallocate their resources and strategic priorities
accordingly. In fact, resource reallocation has already started to happen in the
case of biosimilars to Humira: with so many biosimilars approved by the FDA
waiting to enter the market in 2023, companies have started shifting research
and development (R&D) funds away from biosimilars to Humira and into other
types of biosimilars.42
In addition to increasing costs for patients and health systems, the
detrimental effects of pay-for-delay in the context of biologic-biosimilar
competition are likely to extend into other areas. In 2018, as the number of
agreements between the manufacturer of Humira and biosimilar companies grew
progressively larger, the FDA Commissioner noted that competition-restricting
agreements targeting biosimilars are likely to produce long-term effects and
affect the incentives for the development of new biosimilars: “[T]he net result is
a lopsided playing field that disincentives biosimilar developers from making
the sizable investment in bringing such products to market. I am concerned this
will lead to reduced competition in the long-run and unsustainable costs for these
treatments.”43
But so far, neither the Agency nor commentators have considered a solution
hiding in plain sight: license revocation, a counterpart to the FDA’s power to

40

See infra Part IV.A.
This is a field in which revenues are often measured in the billions. See infra Part II.A.
42
See Kelly Davio, Momenta Drops Biosimilar Adalimumab from Pipeline, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (Aug.
5, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/momenta-drops-biosimilar-adalimumab-from-pipeline
(describing the case of a company engaged in the development of a biosimilar to Humira that decided to halt
ongoing R&D efforts and reallocate $100 million to the development of other biosimilars due to market
saturation).
43
Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Advancing Patient Care Through Competition, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officials/advancing-patientcare-through-competition-04192018.
41
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grant licenses, monitor the production and commercialization of approved
products, and use information generated in connection with these products.
Because manufacturers entering into pay-for-delay agreements fail to generate
meaningful information about their approved biosimilars, this Article argues that
inaction due to pay-for-delay, if unjustified under certain principles,44 falls into
the cases contemplated by law allowing the Agency to revoke market
authorization.45 Moreover, the regulatory language is not merely enabling, but
rather mandatory: the FDA “shall” revoke licenses for biologic products whose
manufacture it cannot monitor and properly evaluate.46 The solution proposed
in this Article is thus already embedded in the regulatory framework, needs no
legislative intervention, and does not constitute an additional burden to an
administrative agency that is already resource-constrained.47 Applying it,
however, would have an immediate and important effect on the availability of
less expensive versions of drugs that are critical to so many patients in the United
States.
With several blockbuster biologics poised to start losing patent protections
in years to come,48 finding ways to disincentivize pay-for-delay in this field
becomes especially relevant. In arguing in favor of an FDA intervention to curb
pay-for-delay, this Article does not seek to minimize the role and centrality of
the antitrust apparatus, but rather to uncover a localized fix that can help in
diminishing the frequency and impact of a specific type of anticompetitive
agreement. In doing so, this Article contributes to the literature on pay-for-delay
and other anticompetitive behaviors in the biopharmaceutical arena, as well as
to the larger ongoing debate surrounding the limitations of long-established
antitrust responses to competition issues.49 Additionally, it makes the case that
the role of the FDA as a competition-distorting entity50 capable of providing
fixes to intersecting regulatory problems should be further explored within the
FDA-as-locus-of-incentives literature. Secondary contributions include a
descriptive account of waves of patent expirations in the pharmaceutical space,51
a questioning and reframing of the licensing function of the FDA as an
44

See infra Part IV.C.2.
See infra Part IV.C.3.
46
21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1) (2019).
47
See, e.g., LESLIE PRAY & SALLY ROBINSON, CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 15 (2007) (“[T]he FDA has been chronically under-funded in carrying out its
responsibilities for ensuring the safety of drugs, medical devices, and the nation’s food supply.”).
48
See infra Part I.B.2.
49
See Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 131 (2018).
50
See infra Part IV.B.
51
See infra Part I.
45
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administrative agency,52 and analysis of regulatory language that reveals current
frameworks to be more capacious than previously thought.53
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the phenomenon of
temporally concentrated expirations of patent in the pharmaceutical space and
explains the relationship between drug patents, prices, and FDA-administered
market exclusivities. Part II focuses on the emergence of biologics at the turn of
the century as the most promising and expensive drugs available to patients, and
the corresponding regulatory pathway created in 2010 for the approval of
biosimilar versions of these drugs. Part III explores ongoing manifestations of
pay-for-delay, presenting a case study on Humira. It then explores the limitations
of current antitrust responses to the problems posed by pay-for-delay,
highlighting the need for cumulative regulatory interventions. Part IV argues
that the FDA is well positioned to perform one such intervention, and that the
existing license revocation regime should be used when biosimilar
manufacturers deliberately fail to bring their products to market after FDA
approval. While the proposal does not require any legislative intervention, Part
IV further sketches out supplemental iterations of the proposed solution, which
would require different forms of implementation. A brief conclusion follows,
emphasizing the welfare-enhancing and fairness goals served by the proposal.

I.

PATENT LIFE AND DRUG PRICES

Intellectual property has become a touchstone of innovation processes in the
life sciences, with many new drugs attracting dozens—and in some instances,
hundreds—of patents, often obtained within a few years of each other. In section
A, the Article explores the relationship between the exclusionary market
position of patentees and drugs prices. Section B then surveys the consequences
and historical evolution of temporally concentrated expiration of pharmaceutical
patents.
A. Pharmaceutical Patents and Generic Competition
Pharmaceutical innovation has long been an intersectional area. It combines
two seemingly straightforward propositions: the discovery and development of
new (or better) human drugs is a desirable societal and public health goal;
however, the arc of pharmaceutical R&D is time-consuming, resource-intensive,
and fraught with scientific and technical challenges.

52
53

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.C.3.
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This worldview of the dynamics of pharmaceutical innovation—whether
grounded in evidence or stemming from perceived imperatives—has become
intertwined with discourses emphasizing the centrality of patents as drivers of
pharmaceutical R&D and, ultimately, pharmaceutical innovation.54 William
Landes and Richard Posner have famously suggested that, under contemporary
intellectual property paradigms, certain segments of the pharmaceutical industry
offer “the strongest case for patents.”55 Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry
has traditionally operated under a patent-centric ethos, both through its practices
and by outwardly portraying patents as sine qua non catalysts of drug
development.56
Arguments surrounding the centrality of patents have progressively been
challenged and refined in scholarship and in practice,57 both generally and in the
specific context of pharmaceuticals.58 In some—albeit limited—areas of
pharmaceutical R&D, scholars have found evidence that patents play a modest
or virtually negligible role in driving innovation.59 In a complementary vein,
54
See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV.
503, 508 (2009) (describing the patent system as a means “to encourage socially valuable investments in R&D
that firms would not otherwise make due to the profit-eroding effects of competition”); see also Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 U. VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615–17 (“Prospect theory fits best in
the pharmaceutical industry.”).
55
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003).
56
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 345, 346 (2007) (noting that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry . . . has sung the praises of the patent system
as a means of promoting costly and risky investments in research and development”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
L. Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 544 (2019) (observing that the pharmaceutical
industry is “a sector sometimes described as the poster child for the pure IP patent system”).
57
See, e.g., Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investments?, 9 ANN. REV. ECON. 441
(2017) (analyzing the effects of elements such as disclosure and prior technology on the alignment between the
incentivizing functions of intellectual property and the social contributions generated by patenting activity);
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 377 (2017) (noting the
failure of current patent models in supporting social network innovation); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government
Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1098 (2013)
(underlying the coexistence of intellectual property rights and other types of incentives, including government
funding). A notable exception to the centrality of patents in pharmaceutical R&D has been documented by Amy
Kapczynski in her study of the network performing R&D on flu vaccines. See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without
Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017); see also Rachel E.
Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 U. MICH. L. REV. 499, 503, 545 (2018) (arguing that the ongoing
development of microbiome-based research would not be disrupted by the removal of patent incentives).
58
See generally Henry G. Grabowski, Joseph A. DiMasi & Genia Long, The Roles of Patents and
Research and Development Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFFS. 302 (2015); Hemel
& Ouellette, supra note 56, at 593–601; Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman,
Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1 (2008) (providing an early overview of collaborative modes of
pharmaceutical R&D).
59
See Kapczynski, supra note 57; Sachs, supra note 57; see also Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public
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researchers have also shown that there are several other types of incentives that
drive innovation—including pharmaceutical innovation—beyond the realm of
patents,60 such as prizes,61 grants,62 and insurance or reimbursement schemes.63
Even when considering the limitations of patent-focused narratives, the fact
remains that the field of pharmaceuticals at large is characterized by innovation
processes that are heavily reliant on patents.64 Studies have estimated that a
single pharmaceutical drug is on average covered by anywhere from 2.7 to 3.5
patents.65 In the case of structurally more complex drugs like biologics,66 that
number can nowadays be significantly higher: for instance, Humira is shielded
from competition by more than 100 patents.67
In enabling innovators to exclude others from the marketplace,68 the patent
system gives rights holders the ability to price goods in monopoly-esque
settings.69 There is currently no other area in which this ability is as debated and

Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
67 (2005) (arguing that strong intellectual property rights undermine R&D focused on solving the problems
posed by antibiotic resistance).
60
See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002) (exploring incentives mechanisms beyond patents); Steven
Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001);
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 56, at 551–54 (surveying the range of patent and non-patent incentives potentially
available to innovators).
61
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 228 (2003)
(proposing a prize system that would complement or even replace the patent system).
62
See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019).
63
See generally Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation
Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) (treating reimbursement as a form of incentive to pharmaceutical
R&D); Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307 (2018) (same).
64
See Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical
Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 300, 303 (2010) (citing empirical
literature on the centrality of the role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D and labeling the pharmaceutical industry
“the poster child for a strong patent system”).
65
See Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 330 (2012) (putting the number of average patents covering a single
pharmaceutical drug at 2.7); Ouellette, supra note 64, at 300 (referencing studies using different metrics to reach
an average of 3.5).
66
See infra Part II.A.
67
Richard Gonzalez—CEO of AbbVie, the manufacturer of Humira—has stated that the company has
been awarded 136 Humira-related patents. Timothy Annett & Anna Edney, Drug Hearing Produces Few
Fireworks as Slog Toward Fixes Begins, BLOOMBERG L., (Feb. 26, 2019, 3:24 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/pharma-and-life-sciences/drug-hearing-produces-few-fireworks-as-slog-toward-fixes-begins; see also
infra Part III.A.
68
Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (conditioning the making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importation of
patented inventions to consent from the rightsholder).
69
But see, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 999, 999 (2014) (arguing that the existence of intellectual property rights cannot be equated with
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contested as when pharmaceutical drugs are at stake.70 Although patents alone
cannot account for concerns surrounding the price of prescription drugs in the
United States, they undoubtedly remain one of the primary tools through which
market exclusion occurs.71
Even in a patent-dense environment such as the pharmaceutical innovation
arena, there are built-in systemic features designed to counterbalance the
anticompetitive effects of exclusivity.72 One of the most salient is the temporary
duration of patents, limited to twenty years.73 In the case of pharmaceutical
drugs, the actual length of exclusivity has been shown to be shorter than the legal
one, as a combination of early patenting practices and lengthy regulatory
approval eat into the lifetime of most patents.74
Once the term expires, competitors are in theory able to enter the market,
thereby driving down the cost of goods. In the case of pharmaceutical drugs,
market entrance may be further delayed if there are non-patent exclusivities at
play.75 A set of statutory exclusivities prevents the approval of generics for
certain periods of time, even if patent protection has ended.76 For instance, in
cases where the original drug manufacturer has obtained FDA approval for a
new chemical entity, the Agency is barred from approving generic applications
for a period of five years, irrespective of patent expiration.77 Similarly, when a
drug manufacturer is granted approval for a new indication for previously
approved drugs, a three-year exclusivity period applies.78 These exclusivities
were introduced in 1984 by the Hatch-Waxman Act,79 with the purpose of
“uniform monopoly pricing and monopoly profits”).
70
See, e.g., Robert Pearl, Why Patent Protection in The Drug Industry Is Out of Control, FORBES (Jan.
19, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2017/01/19/why-patent-protection-in-the-drugindustry-is-out-of-control/#19aaa2578ca9.
71
Other tools include additional market exclusivities granted by the FDA. See generally Yaniv Heled,
Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012).
72
The U.S. Constitution takes an inherently limiting approach to patent rights, which are granted “for
limited times” and with the purpose “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73
35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2).
74
See, e.g., Erika F. Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 59–60 (2018) (citing
several studies exploring the length and underlying justifications for the shorter de facto period of exclusivity).
75
See Heled, supra note 71; see also Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
299 (2015) (describing and criticizing FDA-administered market exclusivities); infra Part I.B (describing the
case of the first generic drug competing with Prozac, for which there was a six-month period of statutory
exclusivity).
76
See Heled, supra note 71, at 422.
77
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).
78
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv).
79
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). The first statutory exclusivity dates
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providing original drug manufacturers with additional incentives to engage in
R&D.80 In return, Hatch-Waxman created a streamlined pathway for the
approval of generics, a process that, until then, required manufacturers to
conduct their own clinical trials, thereby rendering regulatory review too
resource-intensive and expensive for would-be generic drug sponsors.81
Even competition among generic drugs—which are by definition
unpatentable versions of previously approved drugs—may be temporarily
postponed due to FDA exclusivities.82 The first generic manufacturer to file an
application for FDA approval that successfully challenges a patent on an
approved drug is entitled to a 180-day period of exclusivity, during which other
generic manufacturers are unable to enter the market.83
This statutory exclusivity regime applies to most of the drugs currently on
the market: small-molecule drugs, also known as conventional drugs, which are
the product of chemical synthesis. Examples include aspirin, drugs used in the
treatment of high cholesterol levels, and drugs used in the treatment of hepatitis
C. In addition to being small, conventional drugs are structurally simple, stable,
and easy to characterize, manufacture, and replicate. Large-molecule drugs,
known as biologics, possess the opposite characteristics and are subject to a
different regulatory regime, as addressed in Part II.
Released from the requirement of conducting expensive clinical trials since
the mid-1980s,84 generic manufacturers have been able to cheaply produce their
versions of brand-name conventional drugs. In 2018 alone, the FDA approved

back to 1983, when Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act, which established a seven-year exclusivity for drugs
targeting diseases that affect small patient populations (currently defined as 200,000 or fewer patients in the
United States). The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. Law No. 97-414, sec. 525, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21, 26, 35, & 42 U.S.C.); see also Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-conditions (last
visited Nov. 19, 2020).
80
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 717, 727
(2005) (framing the Hatch-Waxman Act as “a complex legislative compromise between the interests of research
pharmaceutical firms and generic competitors”).
81
Id.
82
See Heled, supra note 71, at 428–29.
83
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (laying out the 180-day regulatory exclusivity); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (laying out the framework for the corresponding patent challenge); see also Heled, supra
note 71, at 428–29 (explaining the generic 180-day exclusivity as an incentives mechanism).
84
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (listing the information required for an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA), the type of application required for generic manufacturers seeking market entrance). Since the law no
longer requires a demonstration of safety and effectiveness, generic manufacturers are able to rely on data
submitted by original drug sponsors instead of running their own clinical trials.
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or tentatively approved 1,021 generic applications.85 The Agency relies on
studies estimating that generic drugs cost on average 85% less than brand-name
drugs86 and translate into significant savings to the United States healthcare
system. Sources used by the FDA have calculated that, between 2007 and 2016,
those savings have amounted to $1.67 trillion.87
While the introduction of generics has many positive social and economic
dimensions, from the perspective of brand-name pharmaceutical companies it
marks the downturn in the lifetime of a drug once sheltered from competition.
This Article now turns to that point in time, paying particular attention to the
first waves of patent expiration in the pharmaceutical industry.
B. First Waves of Patent Expiration: Conventional Drugs
As seen above, even though they are relatively simple when compared to
large-molecule drugs, conventional drugs are covered by multiple patents.88
When the main patent, or several of the most relevant patents,89 covering a
pharmaceutical drug approach their term, that drug is said to be facing a patent
cliff.90 The expression has become closely associated with points in time in
which multiple drugs—and especially blockbuster drugs—simultaneously
approach the end of patent life.91 Over the past decade, there have been three
important waves of pharmaceutical patent expirations, which this Article
addresses in the following subsections. Some commentators see the ongoing
wave—affecting biologics—as the tail end of the second wave.92 For reasons
developed below, including the fact that we are currently dealing with the first
wave of patent expiration involving biologic products, this Article argues that
the ongoing wave is best understood as a separate wave.

85
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2018 OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS ANNUAL REPORT ii (2019), https://www.
fda.gov/drugs/2018-office-generic-drugs-annual-report.
86
Generic Drug Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/genericdrug-facts (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (citing information provided by IMS Health Institute).
87
Id.
88
Ouellette, supra note 64, at 300.
89
One example is the patent covering the composition of a drug.
90
See Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 12 (2011)
[hereinafter Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens]; Charlotte Harrison, Dangling from the Patent Cliff, 12 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 14 (2013).
91
See, e.g., Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff”, 37 U.S.
PHARM. 12 (2012) (describing the wave of expirations starting in 2010 as “one of the biggest waves of drug
patent expirations in history, a phenomenon referred to as the ‘patent cliff’”).
92
See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Strap on Your Parachutes, Pharma Faces a Mini Patent Cliff, STAT NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/04/26/patent-cliff-biosimilars-generics/.
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1. The First Waves of Patent Expiration
The first major wave of patent expiration involving pharmaceuticals dates
back to 2001, when the generic version of Prozac entered the market.93 Prozac
is a small-molecule drug used in the treatment of several conditions, including
depression.94 First approved by the FDA in 1987,95 it has been described as a
“breakthrough drug.”96 Until then, there were other types of antidepressant drugs
available to patients, but they operated differently.97 Studies indicated that
Prozac was comparatively superior to these older drugs, causing fewer and less
severe side effects.98 It was also widely marketed as a “wonder drug”99 and
quickly became a best seller, a status it maintained until the turn of the
century.100
The active ingredient in Prozac—fluoxetine—was first identified as a
potential antidepressant in the 1970s by scientists working at Eli Lilly, an
Indiana-based pharmaceutical company.101 Starting in 1974, Eli Lilly applied for
several fluoxetine-related patents, which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

93
See Benjamin G. Druss, Steven C. Marcus, Mark Olfson & Harold Alan Pincus, Listening to Generic
Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFFS. 210, 210 (2014) (noting that “[t]he release of generic
fluoxetine [an antidepressant agent for which Prozac is one of the brand names] in August 2001 marked the
beginning of the largest patent expiration cycle in the history of the pharmaceutical industry”).
94
Prozac Label, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/
2006/018936s076lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
95
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Prozac), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2011/018936s091lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
96
David T. Wong, Kenneth W. Perry & Frank P. Bymaster, The Discovery of Fluoxetine Hydrochloride
(Prozac), 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 764, 764 (2005) (describing the active component in Prozac as
“widely acknowledged as a breakthrough drug for depression”); see also Prozac: Revolution in a Capsule, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000003127845/revolution-in-a-capsule.html?
playlistId=10000000214873.
97
See generally Todd M. Hillhouse & Joseph H. Porter, A Brief History of the Development of
Antidepressant Drugs: From Monoamines to Glutamate, 23 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1 (2015).
98
Barry H. Guze & Michael J. Gitlin, New Antidepressants and the Treatment of Depression, 38 J. FAM.
PRAC. 49, 49 (1994) (noting that Prozac was as effective as preexisting drugs, but generally considered safer).
But see Natalie Angier, Eli Lilly Facing Million-Dollar Suits on Its Antidepressant Drug Prozac, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/16/us/health-eli-lilly-facing-million-dollar-suits-on-itsantidepressant-drug-prozac.html (describing litigation against the manufacturer of Prozac for failure to properly
warn consumers about the side effects of the drug).
99
Mary O’Hara & Pamela Duncan, Why ‘Big Pharma’ Stopped Searching for the Next Prozac,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jan/27/prozac-next-psychiatric-wonderdrug-research-medicine-mental-illness (describing how Prozac was marketed as a “wonder drug”).
100
See CLARK LAWLOR, FROM MELANCHOLIA TO PROZAC: A HISTORY OF DEPRESSION 176 (2012).
101
Cody J. Wenthur, Megan R. Bennett & Craig W. Lindsey, Classics in Chemical Neuroscience:
Fluoxetine (Prozac), 5 ACS CHEM. NEUROSCIENCE REV. 14, 16 (2014) (noting that sales of Prozac peaked in
1998).

RUTSCHMAN_12.2.20

2020]

12/2/2020 2:12 PM

REGULATORY MALFUNCTIONS

365

(PTO) granted through the mid-1980s.102 Following FDA approval, Prozac
entered the United States market in January 1988.103
While on patent, Prozac sales reached as high as $2.8 billion in a single
year.104 It became the largest-grossing drug in its category, and the fifth most
prescribed drug in the United States.105 The last standing patent covering Prozac
expired in August 2001,106 clearing the field for manufacturers of generic
fluoxetine to compete with Eli Lilly. Twenty weeks after the generic version of
Prozac entered the market, generic fluoxetine accounted for 69.6% of all
fluoxetine prescriptions in the United States.107 Nearly three quarters of patients
(73.8%) previously taking Prozac switched to the generic.108 A majority of new
users of fluoxetine (65.8%) were started on the generic instead of Prozac.109
The generic was initially priced at $1.91 per unit, 12% less than Prozac’s
price per unit.110 The price of the generic did not change for the first six months,
which corresponded to the period of statutory exclusivity awarded to Barr
Laboratories, the first manufacturer of generic fluoxetine.111 As exclusivity
came to an end and other manufacturers were able to enter the market and
compete with Barr Laboratories, the price of generic fluoxetine decreased
significantly and quickly: during the year that followed the end of statutory
exclusivity, it went down to $0.32 per unit, or by a factor of six.112 Generic

102
U.S. Patent No. 4,018,895 (issued Apr. 19, 1977); U.S. Patent No. 4,314,081 (issued Feb. 2, 1982);
U.S. Patent No. 4,590,213 (issued May 20, 1986); U.S. Patent No. 4,626,549 (issued Dec. 2, 1986).
103
Tara McKelvey, How Prozac Entered the Lexicon, BBC NEWS MAG. (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.bbc.
com/news/magazine-22040733.
104
See Wenthur et al., supra note 101; see also Druss et al., supra note 93 (reporting that Prozac averaged
$2.7 billion in annual sales while on patent, according to an IMS Health study on the ten best-selling drugs in
the U.S. market by sales volume).
105
Druss et al., supra note 93.
106
Eli Lilly sought to prevent Prozac competitors from entering the market until 2003, but the Federal
Circuit held that the latest-expiring patent covering Prozac was invalid due to double-patenting. Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the ‘549 patent was invalid on grounds of
obviousness with reference to the ‘895 patent); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 972 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (vacating the 2000 decision, but still holding the ‘549 patent invalid on grounds of obviousness, now with
reference to the ‘213 patent).
107
Druss et al., supra note 93, at 211 (noting that “the proportion of fluoxetine users in the population did
not change after the introduction of the generic”).
108
Id.
109
Id. The Druss study also showed that the substitution effect was limited to Prozac, noting that only
0.9% of patients treated with antidepressant drugs other than Prozac switched to generic fluoxetine: “There was
almost no evidence of switching to generic fluoxetine among patients treated with medications other than
Prozac.” Id. at 213.
110
Id.
111
Id.; see also supra Part I.A.
112
Druss et al., supra note 93, at 213.

RUTSCHMAN_12.2.20

366

12/2/2020 2:12 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:347

competition had the opposite effect on the price of Prozac: during the same
period of time, the price per unit increased from $2.25 to $2.40.113
Even though Prozac was priced higher than before, generic substitution
sharply curtailed its revenue stream. By 2005, Prozac was generating $453
million in sales, down from the $2.7 billion it was averaging while on patent.114
Referencing the moment of patent expiration in 2001, a commentator observed
that Prozac’s manufacturer “lost . . . $35 million of its market value in a single
day.”115
In the years after Prozac began facing generic competition, other drugs used
as antidepressants also went off patent.116 Zoloft, a small-molecule drug
manufactured by Pfizer and marketed in the United States since 1991, was (and
is) used to treat a range of conditions that overlap with those targeted by
Prozac.117 Although both drugs belong to the same class,118 Zoloft’s active
ingredient is different from Prozac’s.119 Pfizer held two patents on Zoloft.120
While on patent, Zoloft generated over $2 billion in revenue in 2002.121 In 2005,
the last full year before the patent on Zoloft’s composition expired, that number
had surpassed the $3 billion barrier.122 As Zoloft lost patent protection123 in June
2006, the first generic version of the drug entered the United States market.124
Pfizer’s annual revenue was immediately projected to go down to $470
million.125

113

Id.
Aaron Smith, Who Stands to Gain When Zoloft Goes Generic?, CNN MONEY (Apr. 4, 2006, 5:13 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2006/04/04/news/companies/antidepressants/; see supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
115
Wenthur et al., supra note 101.
116
Druss et al., supra note 93, at 215.
117
See Zoloft Label, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/
2009/019839s070,020990s032lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
118
Collectively, the drugs referenced in this section belong to the class of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors, commonly known as SSRIs. Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) Information, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/selective-serotonin-reuptake-inhibitorsssris-information (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
119
Zoloft’s active ingredient is sertraline hydrochloride, whereas Prozac’s is fluoxetine. Compare supra
note 117, with supra note 94.
120
U.S. Patent No. 4,536,518 (issued Aug. 20, 1985) (covering the drug’s composition); U.S. Patent No.
5,248,699 (issued Sept. 28, 1994) (covering another form of the drug, as well as a method of preparation).
121
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
122
Smith, supra note 114 (putting the number at $3.3 billion).
123
See ‘518 Patent (covering the drug’s composition); see also Teva, 395 F.3d at 1326–27 (describing the
patent challenges brought by Teva prior to introduction of its generic version of Zoloft on the market).
124
Smith, supra note 114.
125
Id.
114

RUTSCHMAN_12.2.20

2020]

12/2/2020 2:12 PM

REGULATORY MALFUNCTIONS

367

While the pronounced decline in the sales of Prozac and Zoloft illustrates
how generic competition leads to immediate market erosion, patent expiration
does not normally extinguish the demand for brand-name drugs. For instance,
three and a half years after losing patent protection, Zoloft was earning Pfizer
$516 million globally.126 In 2016, that number decreased to $304 million.127
According to the latest available data, pertaining to 2018, Zoloft generated $298
million.128 Prozac sales, as seen above, saw a similar downward trajectory.129
Globally, in the wake of the 2001 patent expiration wave, R&D on
psychiatric drugs diminished considerably, with some studies estimating that
decrease at around 70%.130 At the same time, the use of antidepressants went
up.131 This is not to say that patent expiration and loss of regulatory exclusivities
are the sole causes of decline in R&D in the conventional drug space. After a
period of scientific breakthroughs and commercial growth, it has also become
more difficult to develop new small-molecule drugs.132
The second wave—which began around 2011133 and affected the thenlargest-grossing drug in the world, Lipitor134—also needs to be understood
against a broader context. Several studies published in 2012 reported that, for
the first time in over two decades, spending on prescription drugs in the United

126
Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results (Feb. 2, 2010),
https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer_reports_fourth_quarter_and_full_year_
2009_results_provides_2010_financial_guidance_and_2012_financial_targets.
127
Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2016 Results 37 (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_news/2016/Q4_2016_PFE_Earnings_Press_Release_dwerfks.pdf.
128
Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2018 Results 40 (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_financials/Quarterly/2018/q4/Q4-2018-PFE-Earnings-Release.pdf.
129
See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. This category includes Prozac, Prozac Weekly, and
Eli Lilly’s own generic version of the drug used to treat premenstrual dysphoric disorder, Sarafem. See ELI LILLY
& CO., ANSWERS FOR SHAREHOLDERS 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 9 (2005), https://investor.lilly.com/staticfiles/67d703e8-99e6-49e6-836d-4c39686df4c2 (depicting decline in revenue from Prozac, Prozac Weekly, and
Sarafem in the four years that followed Eli Lilly’s patent expiration).
130
O’Hara & Duncan, supra note 99.
131
Id. (citing Julia Calderon, The Rise of All-Purpose Antidepressants, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-rise-of-all-purpose-antidepressants/).
132
See Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1023.
133
See Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, supra note 90.
134
Lipitor is a small-molecule drug used in the treatment of high cholesterol. Id.
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States had declined135 as a result of an economic downturn.136 A study by IMS
Health calculated a decrease of 1% in nominal drug spending in the United
States,137 while another study by Express Scripts put that number at 1.5%.138
According to the latter study, the majority of drugs contributing to the 1.5% drop
were “traditional prescription drugs” treating “common diseases” like high
blood pressure.139 For drugs targeting “more complex diseases,” including
oncology and autoimmune conditions, the same study reported an actual
increase of 18.4%.140 Many of these complex medical conditions are now treated
by large-molecule drugs, which until much more recently had never faced
exposure to follow-on competitors.
2. The New Waves of Patent Expiration
Between 2016 and the mid-2020s, a significant number of commercially
successful drugs have lost or are expected to lose patent protection. Among these
are several small-molecule drugs, including Truvada, a drug used in the
treatment and prevention of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS),141
whose key patent on composition expired in 2017;142 Lyrica, an anti-epileptic
drug also used in the treatment of nerve pain (such as fibromyalgia),143 which
lost patent protection in 2019;144 and Tecfidera, used in the treatment of

135
A study by the IMS Health calculated the total of nominal drug spending in the U.S. in 2012 to have
reached $325.8 billion. See Tracy Staton, Behold the Patent Cliff: U.S. Drug Market Shrinks for First Time,
FIERCEPHARMA (May 9, 2013), https://www.fiercepharma.com/regulatory/behold-patent-cliff-u-s-drug-marketshrinks-for-first-time (citing IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND COSTS:
FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 8 (2013),
http://www.sefap.it/web/upload/2012_USMedicines_Report.pdf). The study further reported that per capita
spending was calculated to have dropped by 3.5%. Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2012 EXPRESS SCRIPTS DRUG TREND REPORT 12 (2013), https://lab.expressscripts.com/lab/insights/industry-updates/2012-drug-trend-report.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Trudy Ring, FDA Approves Generic Version of Truvada, HIV PLUS (Jun. 20, 2018, 8:51 AM),
https://www.hivplusmag.com/prevention/2018/6/20/fda-approves-generic-version-truvada (noting Truvada cost
$1,500 per month while on-patent).
142
The patent covering tenofovir disoproxil fumarate expired in July 2017. Ryan Marotta, Truvada
Commercial During ‘Rent: Live’ Sparks Dialogue About PrEP Accessibility, PHARM. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 9:49
PM),
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/resource-centers/hiv/truvada-commercial-during-rent-live-sparksdialogue-about-prep-accessibility (citing Benjamin Ryan, FDA Approves Generic Truvada for HIV Treatment
and PrEP, POZ (June 9, 2017), https://www.poz.com/article/fda-approves-generic-truvada).
143
Medication Guide: Lyrica, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_
docs/label/2018/021446s035,022488s013lbl.pdf (May 2018).
144
Eric Sagonowsky, Pfizer Wins Blockbuster Lyrica Patent Extension to Safeguard Sales till June,
FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 28, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/pfizer-wins-blockbuster-
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relapsing multiple sclerosis,145 which is losing key patents in 2019 and currently
faces a patent challenge that could allow for generic competition as early as
2020.146
Before losing patent protection, Truvada generated up to $2.6 billion per
year in sales in the United States.147 Lyrica averaged sales in excess of $3 billion
in the United States in the years prior to patent expiration,148 while Tecfidera
averaged $4 billion.149 As in previous instances of patent expirations, as
manufacturers of generics are allowed to enter the market, revenues associated
with these drugs are projected to decline.150
Given the proximity between the tail end of the 2011 wave and the ongoing
loss of patent and exclusivity protection affecting several blockbuster drugs,
some commentators see a continuity between the second wave and the ongoing
one.151 The wave that began in 2016, however, is significantly different from
previous ones, as it includes for the first time the larger, more complex drugs
known as biologics.152 This Article thus treats the 2016 wave separately, not
only materially, but also because it takes the view that the legal and policy
problems posed by competition involving biologic drugs should be addressed in
significantly different ways from the ones adopted in connection with the 2001

patent-extension-for-lyrica-exclusivity-now-stretches-until-june (describing how Lyrica enjoyed patent
protection until the end of 2018, followed by regulatory exclusivity through the end of June 2019).
145
Approval Package (Tecfidera), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/204063Orig1s010.pdf.
146
See Eric Sagonowsky, Biogen Faces Multibillion-Dollar Tecfidera Loss if Mylan Wins Latest Patent
Threat, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 7, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/biogen-faces-newpatent-threat-from-mylan-blockbuster-tecfidera.
147
Eric Sagonowsky, Gilead’s $3B Truvada Will Face Generics a Year Early. Can Descovy Still Win
Over Its Patients?, FIERCEPHARMA (May 9, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/asurprise-gilead-s-3b-per-year-truvada-to-face-generics-next-year (additionally reporting worldwide sales of
Truvada reaching $3 billion in 2018).
148
Sagonowksy, supra note 144.
149
Press Release, Bus. Wire, Biogen Reports Record Revenues for Both the Full Year and Fourth Quarter
of 2017, $12.3 Billion and $3.3 Billion, Respectively (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20180125005353/en/Biogen-Reports-Record-Revenues-for-Both-the-Full-Year-and-Fourth-Quarter-of2017-12.3-Billion-and-3.3-Billion-Respectively; see also Jonathan Gardner, After Alzheimer’s Collapse, Biogen
Must Win Tecfidera Patent Challenge, EVALUATE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.evaluate.com/node/14519/pdf.
150
See, e.g., Phil Taylor, As Lyrica Patent Expiry Looms, Pfizer Buys Array for $11.4bn, PHARMAPHORUM
(June 17, 2019), https://pharmaphorum.com/news/as-lyrica-patent-expiry-looms-pfizer-buys-array-for-11-4bn/
(describing the expected impact of generic competition on Lyrica sales).
151
Silverman, supra note 92 (quoting an industry analyst stating that “[i]t may be incorrect to claim that
the [2011] ‘patent cliff’ has passed”).
152
Id. (acknowledging that biologic drugs are facing a so-called “patent cliff” for the first time).
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and 2011 waves.153 The characteristics of biologics and the challenges related to
biologic competition are addressed, respectively, in Parts II and III.
Among the biologics losing patent protection during the current wave is the
largest-grossing drug (of any kind) in the world, Humira, which is the subject of
a case study in Part III. Several other blockbuster biologics will face the loss of
total or partial patent protection during the ongoing wave. These include
Rituxan, used in the treatment of some cancers and rheumatoid arthritis, among
other indications,154 whose patent estate began expiring in 2018;155 Herceptin,
widely used in the treatment of breast cancer,156 which lost patent protection in
the U.S. in 2019;157 and Avastin, an oncology drug that is also used in the
treatment of eye disease,158 which also lost patent protection in the United States
in 2019 and is set to lose protection in Europe in 2022.159
While on-patent, these three biologics were among the best-selling drugs
domestically and abroad. During their last year of full patent protection,
Herceptin and Avastin generated $2.5 billion and $3 billion, respectively, in the
United States market.160 Rituxan, exposed earlier to competition, had sales
declining from $7.32 billion in 2015161 to $4.92 billion in 2018162 and is
predicted to endure further erosion as competitors enter the market.163

153
See infra Part IV (arguing that reliance on antitrust tools should be complemented by a stricter approach
to the FDA’s power to grant licenses covering pharmaceutical drugs).
154
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Rituxan), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/103705s5367s5388lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
155
Trefis Team, Roche’s Blockbuster Oncology Drugs Losing Steam as They Approach Patent Expiry,
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/10/12/rochesblockbuster-oncology-drugs-losing-steam-as-they-approach-patent-expiry/#5247b5775d13.
156
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Herceptin), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/103792s5250lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
157
Staines, supra note 16.
158
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Avastin), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2014/125085s301lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020); David Turbert,
What Is Avastin?, AM. ACAD. OPTHAMOLOGY (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.aao.org/eye-health/drugs/avastin.
159
FDA Approves Bevacizumab Biosimilar Mvasi, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (July 19, 2017),
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/FDA-approves-bevacizumab-biosimilar-Zirabev.
160
Amy Brown, Roche Dominates 2019’s Big Patent Expiries, EVALUATE (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.evaluate.com/vantage/articles/data-insights/other-data/roche-dominates-2019s-big-patent-expiries
(reporting revenue from 2018). As of late 2018, Herceptin and Avastin had generated $43.1 billion and $49.4
billion, respectively, in lifetime sales. Id.
161
Michael Gibney, Rituxan, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 16, 2016, 2:35 PM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
special-report/12-rituxan.
162
Eric Saganowsky, Rituxan, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
special-report/rituxan-3.
163
Id.
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II. BIOLOGICS AND PATENT TERM EXPIRATION
As a whole, biologics are among the most complex, costly, and promising
drugs available to patients today. Part A briefly outlines the main differences
between biologics and conventional drugs, and Part B contextualizes the
emergence of the first generation of follow-on biologics.
A. Biologics: “The Most Promising Drugs”
Biologics are large-molecule drugs made of living materials.164 Their
structure is so complex that they have been contrasted with conventional drugs
in the following way: “[I]f an aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be
a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F-16 fighter jet.”165
Unlike small-molecule drugs, which are chemically synthesized, biologics
are also difficult to characterize and sensitive to manufacturing changes.166 In
addition to rendering them costly to develop, this makes biologics very hard to
replicate in sharp contrast with conventional drugs, which are easily reverse
engineered.167
At the same time, biologics are widely considered among the “most
promising”168 drugs available to patients today.169 They are currently used to
treat a wide array of diseases, from several types of cancer to common
inflammatory diseases including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and Crohn’s
disease. They are also among the most expensive drugs in the market. Herceptin,
one of the biologics that lost patent protection in 2019,170 cost $54,000 per year
164

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1026 (citing Deepak Gupta, GN Prashanth & Sanjay Lodha, A CMO
Perspective on Quality Challenges for Biopharmaceuticals, BIOPROCESS INT’L (Oct. 1, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://bioprocessintl.com/manufacturing/monoclonal-antibodies/a-cmo-perspective-on-quality-challenges-forbiopharmaceuticals-347335/).
166
What Are “Biologics”, supra note 12.
167
See Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, Kevin A. Schulman & Tomas J. Philipson, Entry and
Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439, 439–40 (2007); see also DAN L.
BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 39, 86–87 (2009)
(describing the ease and relatively low cost for generic competitors to replicate bioequivalents).
168
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1026.
169
See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION i (2009) [hereinafter EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commissionreport/p083901biologicsreport.pdf (detailing the positive impact of biologics); Bahija Jallal, Realizing the
Promise of Biologics, HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.hhpronline.org/articles/2017/4/9/
realizing-the-promise-of-biologics (describing the unique benefits biologics contribute to the future of
healthcare).
170
Staines, supra note 16.
165
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in 2012,171 and as much as $70,000 in 2016.172 The anti-inflammatory biologic
Humira, which has been the world’s best-selling drug for several years, costs up
to $50,000 a year in the United States,173 even though several critical patents on
the drug have expired.174 Over the last few years, very promising gene therapies
approved by the FDA were (at least initially) priced in the high six figures.175
And very recently, Zolgensma,176 a gene therapy targeting a rare form of
muscular atrophy, broke the $2 million barrier.177
While biologic products have been on the market since the mid-1980s,178
when the FDA approved the first therapeutic monoclonal antibody,179 the boom
in the commercialization of biologics—especially the more complex ones—did
not take place until the turn of the century.180 Rituxan, Herceptin, and Avastin,
171

Staton, supra note 16 (citing a monthly cost of $4,500).
Ed Silverman, Genentech Accused Again of Cheating Health Care Providers, STAT NEWS (Mar. 20,
2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/20/genentech-herceptin-prices/.
173
Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents to Delay Generic Versions,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/makers-of-humira-and-enbrelusing-new-drug-patents-to-delay-generic-versions.html.
174
See infra Part III.A.
175
Emily Mullin, Tracking the Cost of Gene Therapy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.
technologyreview.com/2017/10/24/148183/tracking-the-cost-of-gene-therapy/ (listing price tags between
$373,000 and $1 million for the gene therapies commercialized under the brand names Kymriah, Strimvelis,
Luxturna, and Glybera).
176
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Zolgensma), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
media/126109/download (May 2019).
177
See, e.g., Rob Stein, At $2.1 Million, New Gene Therapy Is the Most Expensive Drug Ever, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (May 24, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/05/24/
725404168/at-2-125-million-new-gene-therapy-is-the-most-expensive-drug-ever; John Miller & Carolyn
Humer, Novartis $2 Million Gene Therapy for Rare Disorder Is World’s Most Expensive Drug, REUTERS (May
24, 2019, 12:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-novartis-genetherapy/novartis-2-million-genetherapy-for-rare-disorder-is-worlds-most-expensive-drug-idUSKCN1SU1ZP. See generally Bill Cassidy, How
Will We Pay for the Coming Generation of Potentially Curative Gene Therapies?, STAT NEWS (June 12, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/12/paying-for-coming-generation-gene-therapies/ (outlining both newly
adopted and proposed payment solutions to address the cost of expensive drugs which could be potentially
applicable to gene therapies); Mark R. Trushei, William M. Cassidy & Peter B. Bach, Alternative State-Level
Financing for Hepatitis C Treatment—The “Netflix Model”, 320 J. AM. MED ASS’N 1977 (2018) (providing
background on Cassidy’s proposal).
178
See Sy Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs: How the Maker of the World’s Bestselling Drug Keeps Prices
Sky-High, FORTUNE (July 18, 2019 6:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/abbvie-humira-drug-costsinnovation/ (framing the FDA approval of the first immunosuppressant as the de facto moment in which
biologics entered the United States market).
179
Id.; see Dawn M. Ecker, Susan Dana Jones & Howard L. Levine, The Therapeutic Monoclonal
Antibody Market, 7 MABS 9, 9 (2015). Prior to 1986, insulin and several therapeutic proteins had also entered
the U.S. market through the FDA’s new drug application (NDA) pathway—which technically applies to smallmolecule drugs—and not the biologic license application (BLA) pathway. See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey
Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 684–85 (2010).
180
Biological Approvals by Year, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/
172
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three of the leading oncology drugs losing patent protection, were approved in
1997, 1998, and 2004, respectively.181 These are among the increasing number
of biologics now approaching the end of their patent life or exclusivity period,
or both.182
Throughout the 2000s, biologics entering the United States market faced
virtually no competition. As described in Part I, a regulatory pathway for the
approval of generic versions of small-molecule drugs was created by the HatchWaxman Act in 1984.183 As a result, the generic industry soared.184 HatchWaxman, however, provided no similar avenue for large-molecule drugs. This
scenario changed in 2010, with the enactment of the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act (BPCIA),185 a component of the Affordable Care Act
package.186 The Act established an abbreviated pathway for the approval of
drugs that are biosimilar or interchangeable with an already approved biologic.
These follow-on biologics cannot be properly characterized as generics, as it is
technically impossible to create a replica of a biologic drug. But follow-on
biologics were expected to offer a clinically equivalent alternative to originator
biologics, as well as a relatively more affordable one.
From a regulatory perspective, one of the main contrasts between smallmolecule drugs and biologics is that the period of FDA-administered exclusivity
regime is significantly different. Conventional drugs benefit from a period of
five years of protection over clinical trial data, independent of the status of patent
protection.187 The period of market exclusivity often expires before patents
covering small-molecule drugs do.188 Biologics, on the other hand, benefit from
a much longer exclusivity period, currently set at twelve years.189
20170111000524/http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicalAppr
ovalsbyYear/default.htm.
181
Zhenping Zhu & Li Yan, Next Generation of Antibody Therapy for Cancer, 5 CHINESE J. CANCER 293
(2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4013394/.
182
Arlene Weintraub, Roche’s Patent Cliff Just Got Steeper as FDA Approves Celltrion’s Rituxan
Biosimilar Truxima, FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 29, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/
roche-s-patent-cliff-just-got-steeper-as-fda-approves-celltrion-s-rituxan-biosimilar-truxima.
183
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
184
See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 293, 307–12 (2015).
185
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
186
42 U.S.C. § 262.
187
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
188
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1027.
189
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A); see also § 262(k)(7)(B) (prohibiting the FDA from accepting biosimilar
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B. Follow-On Biologics
The result of protracted negotiations, the BPCIA was enacted in 2010,190 a
few years before the beginning of the first wave of patent term expiration for
biologic drugs took place, and around the time the second wave of patent term
expiration for conventional drugs began unfolding.
Like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA created an expedited review and approval
process for second-comers wishing to compete with a drug previously approved
by the FDA.191 Unlike conventional drugs covered by Hatch-Waxman, biologic
drugs cannot be replicated to create generic versions. As a result, the BPCIA
established an abbreviated pathway for the licensure of two different types of
follow-on biologics192 that is substantially different from the Hatch-Waxman
generic pathway.193
The BPCIA distinguishes between biosimilar and interchangeable follow-on
biologics.194 Sponsors of biosimilars must demonstrate that their product is
“highly similar”195 to the reference product,196 and that there are “no clinically
meaningful differences” between the follow-on and the reference biologic.197
When applying for a license, sponsors of biosimilars may rely on preexisting,
publicly available data establishing the safety, purity, and potency of the
reference product.198 In addition to showing that the biosimilar meets the
standards of high similarity and absence of clinically meaningful differences
when compared to the reference product,199 sponsors are required to submit

applications until four years have passed from the date of the approval of the originator biologic).
190
See Carver et al., supra note 179, at 671 (discussing the negotiation process, which, with regard to
some of the issues covered by the BPCIA, took as long as ten years).
191
In addition to establishing an abbreviated pathway for the licensure of follow-on biologics, the BPCIA
also regulates the approval of new biologics and lays out the framework for challenges to patents covering
biologics. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(a), (k)(6). The complexity of the statute prompted Federal Circuit Judge Lourie
to quip that “Winston Churchill once described Russia as a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma . . . [t]hat is this statute.” Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
192
Biosimilar and Interchangeable Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
193
See Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 44
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 886 (2017) (showing that the “biologic framework separates patents, functionally and
conceptually, from the regulatory paradigm”).
194
42 U.S.C. § 262(k).
195
§ 262(i)(2)(A).
196
§ 262(i)(4) (defining reference product as a “single biological product” already licensed by the FDA).
197
§ 262(i)(2)(B).
198
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(iii).
199
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(IV).
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specific information regarding any facilities where the biosimilar is produced,
as well as information about its manufacturing processes.200
Sponsors of interchangeable follow-on biologics must demonstrate that, in
addition to meeting the standards for biosimilarity, their product may be used as
a substitute for the reference biologic “without the intervention of the health care
provider who prescribed the reference product.”201 In practice, and in line with
FDA guidance,202 the latter requirement means that the interchangeable product
“can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in
any given patient.”203
While the BPCIA was signed into law in 2010, the FDA did not approve a
single biosimilar until March 2015.204 The following year, the Agency approved
three biosimilars, followed by five in 2017,205 including the first biosimilar to be
used in the treatment of any type of cancer.206 In 2018, seven biosimilars were
approved, and in 2019 that number climbed to ten.207 As of January 2020, there
are twenty-six biosimilars approved by the FDA.208 To date, no interchangeable
follow-on biologic has been approved in the United States.209
As biosimilars begin entering the market and compete with biologics, they
are expected to translate into savings for patients and the health system in the
near future. Estimates, however, vary widely. A study from 2018 calculated that,
between 2017 and 2026, direct spending on biologics would decrease by $54
billion as a result of biosimilar competition.210 Another one, referring to the
200

§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
§ 262(i)(3).
202
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGEABILITY WITH A
REFERENCE PRODUCT 1 (2019) [hereinafter CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGEABILITY],
https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download (providing guidance with a focus on therapeutic protein
biologics).
203
§ 262(k)(4)(A)(ii).
204
Press Release, Sandoz, FDA Approves First Biosimilar Zarxio (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.us.sandoz.
com/news/media-releases/fda-approves-first-biosimilar-zarxiotm-filgrastimsndz.
205
Biosimilar Product Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/
biosimilar-product-information (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
206
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Biosimilar for the Treatment of Cancer
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-biosimilartreatment-cancer.
207
Biosimilar Product Information, supra note 205.
208
Id.
209
The FDA finalized guidance on the pathway for expedited review and approval of interchangeable
biologic products in mid-2019. See CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGEABILITY, supra note
202.
210
Andrew W. Mulcahy, Jakub P. Hlavka & Spencer R. Case, Biosimilar Cost Savings in the United
States: Initial Experience and Future Potential, 7 RAND HEALTH Q. 3, 3 (2018) (noting that the estimated amount
201
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period between 2014 and 2024, posited that savings generated by the
introduction of biosimilars could be as high as $250 billion.211 A 2019 study put
that number back at $60 billion over the next decade.212
Even though savings brought about through biosimilar competition are
considerable,213 experts agree that they are very unlikely to be proportionally as
high as the ones triggered by the introduction of generics vis-à-vis conventional
drugs. Generic competition drives prices down sharply. A recent study on the
U.S. market reported savings of almost $2 trillion attributable to sales of generics
in lieu of brand-name drugs between 2009 and 2018.214 Follow-on biologics, in
contrast, are estimated to reduce prices by 10% to 30%.215 In Europe, where
biosimilar competition began years ahead of the United States, early indicators
put that number at around 25%.216 Even though these percentages are
substantially lower than discounts introduced by generics, it is worth pointing
out that biologics are significantly costlier to manufacturers and pricier to
consumers than conventional drugs.217 As such, relative savings introduced by
biosimilar competition should not be overlooked. The following Part introduces
a case study illustrating this point, focusing on the biologic Humira, which has
been the world’s best-selling drug in any category for the past seven years.
III. DELAYED COMPETITION IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOLOGICS
This Article now turns to the dynamics of competition between biologics
and biosimilars, exploring current misalignments between legal regimes that
enable some players to control—and, most importantly, delay—market entrance
of follow-on biosimilars. This Article illustrates this problem through a case
study on the best-selling biologic Humira, and then describes the existing legal
framework addressing pay-for-delay agreements—not to opine on the outcome
is the equivalent of roughly 3% of estimated spending on biologics during the same period).
211
Steve Miller, Customer Perspective on Biosimilars, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20
Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/miller.pdf.
212
Structural Market Changes Needed in U.S. to Achieve Cost-Savings from Biosimilars, BIOSIMILARS F.,
Mar. 19, 2019, at 3.
213
See infra Part III; Mulcahy et al., supra note 210.
214
See, e.g., ASS’N. ACCESSIBLE MEDS., 2019 GENERIC DRUG AND BIOSIMILARS ACCESS AND SAVINGS IN
THE U.S. REPORT (2019), https://accessiblemeds.org/resources/blog/2019-generic-drug-and-biosimilars-accesssavings-us-report.
215
EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES, supra note 169, at 23, 47, 53.
216
See Francis Mergelin, Ruth Lopert, Ken Taymor & Jean-Hughes Trouvin, Biosimilars and the
European Experience: Implications for the United States, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1803, 1805 (2013).
217
See infra Part III.
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of the Humira case from an antitrust perspective, but rather to illustrate the
insufficiencies of current interlocking regulatory regimes in promptly
scrutinizing competition-diminishing behaviors among firms in the biologic
drug space.
A. A Case Study on Humira
Humira is the originator brand-name of the biologic adalimumab. This
section traces the introduction of Humira in the United States market and abroad,
and it describes the follow-on competition landscape, with a focus on
agreements currently in place to delay market entrance of biosimilars to Humira.
1. The World’s Best-Selling Drug
First approved in United States in late 2002,218 Humira, an antiinflammatory biologic,219 has been used in the treatment of a wide array of
diseases, including rheumatoid arthritis,220 certain forms of psoriasis,221
ulcerative colitis,222 and Crohn’s disease.223
Humira has often been described as a “miracle drug”224 and has enjoyed
great commercial success.225 At a time when breakthroughs in the conventional
218
CBER Approval Letter, Adalimumab (HUMIRA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2003/ifnbser050203L.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2020).
219
Highlights of Prescribing Information (Humira), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/125057s232lbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
220
Lynne M. Bang & Gillian M. Keating, Adalimumab: A Review of Its Use in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 18
BIODRUGS 121, 126 (2004).
221
Eihab A. Alwawi, Stephanie L. Mehlis & Kenneth B. Gordon, Treating Psoriasis with Adalimumab, 4
THERAPEUTICS CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 345, 345 (2008).
222
William J. Sandborn et al., Adalimumab Induces and Maintains Clinical Remission in Patients with
Moderate-to-Severe Ulcerative Colitis, 142 GASTROENTEROLOGY 257, 257 (2012).
223
Andrea Cassinotti, Sandro Ardizzone & Gabriele Bianchi Porro, Adalimumab for the Treatment of
Crohn’s Disease, 2 BIOLOGICS: TARGETS THERAPY 763, 763 (2008).
224
Elizabeth Glasure, Biospace Feature: A Look at Miracle Drug Humira’s Journey to Proven Efficacy,
BIOSPACE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/biospace-feature-a-look-at-miracle-drug-humira-sjourney-to-proven-efficacy-/.
225
See, e.g., Mukherjee, supra note 178 (underscoring the positive impact of Humira across different
patient populations). It is nonetheless worth pointing out that Humira’s manufacturer (initially Abbott
Laboratories and then its spin-off, AbbVie) has been chastised by the FDA for mishandling death complaints
related to Humira, and it has also been involved in litigation for failure to warn about certain severe side effects.
See Tietz v. Abbott Lab’ys, 2013 WL 5872260 (May 9, 2013) (noting that the jury found that the manufacturer
had failed to warn patients of the risk of lung infection, as well as breach of duty of care under state law for
failure to warn physicians about said risk); Delano v. Abbott Lab’ys, 908 F. Supp. 2d 888 (2012) (challenging
the manufacturer’s failure to update Humira’s black-box warning to include information on a certain type of
fungal infection, but ultimately dismissed); Murthy v. Abbott Lab’ys, 847 F. Supp. 2d 958 (2012) (claiming
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drug space appear increasingly scarce,226 the popularity of Humira, as well as
the relative consensus227 in the medical literature reviewing it, speak to the
current emphasis placed on biologics as the most promising drugs available to
patients.228
Since 2012, Humira has been the world’s best-selling drug, among
conventional drugs and biologics alike,229 with revenue steadily increasing every
year from 2012 through 2019. As of late 2018, Humira had generated lifetime
sales in excess of $115 billion,230 and is commercialized in over sixty markets.231
According to the most recent data from 2018, Humira brought in $19.9 billion
in worldwide sales, a number that represents an 8.2% increase from 2017.232 In
2016, global sales generated $16.1 billion, up from $14.0 billion in 2015, $12.5
billion in 2014, $10.7 billion in 2013, and $9.3 billion in 2012.233
While Humira is a blockbuster drug globally, it has derived most of its
revenue from the United States market.234 It also accounts for the majority (60%)
of the revenue of its current manufacturer, Chicago-based AbbVie.235
The record-shattering revenue generated by Humira is not only a function of
its popularity. In addition to the main patent covering its composition, set to

failure to warn of a possible association between Humira and heightened risk of certain types of lymphoma, but
ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim); see also Ed Silverman, AbbVie Is Reprimanded by the FDA for
Failing to Properly Probe Death Complaints, STAT NEWS (Jun. 8, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/
2018/06/08/abbvie-fda-patients-deaths/ (noting that Humira was not the only product for which the manufacturer
had improperly dealt with death complaints).
226
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1026 (“Spending on small-molecule drugs is close to stagnant, especially
in developed countries.”).
227
At least one study has suggested that, given its price point in 2017, Humira was not cost-effective, and
that there were at least two competitors that might work better for rheumatoid arthritis. See Jackie Syrop, Humira
Not Cost Effective for RA, ICER Report Concludes, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.
centerforbiosimilars.com/news/humira-not-cost-effective-for-ra-icer-report-concludes.
228
But see Mukherjee, supra note 178.
229
Humphreys, supra note 4.
230
Bob Herman, Humira Sales Approach $20 Billion, AXIOS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.axios.com/
abbvie-humira-2018-sales-20-billion-e4039176-baeb-44ff-b4fe-1b63005283b9.html.
231
See Mukherjee, supra note 178.
232
See Herman, supra note 230.
233
Matej Mikulic, AbbVie’s Revenue from Top Product Humira from 2011 to 2019 (in Million U.S.
Dollars), STATISTA (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/318206/revenue-of-humira/. The year
before it became the world’s best-selling drug, Humira generated $7.9 billion in global revenue. Id. Early on,
just two years after receiving FDA approval, Humira was generating as much as $2 billion in global revenue,
already well above the threshold for a drug to be considered a blockbuster, which is typically seen as $1 billion.
See Mukherjee, supra note 178.
234
See Herman, supra note 230.
235
Mikulic, supra note 233.
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expire in late 2016,236 Humira was at one point covered by over one hundred
additional patents,237 which have largely contributed to giving AbbVie the
ability to charge progressively more for Humira. Between 2006 and 2017, the
price increased more than threefold, from $16,636 to $58,612 per year.238 On
average, AbbVie raised the price more than 12% a year.239 From 2014 to 2015
alone, the price hike was 22%.240 Calculations indicate that, after rebates,
Humira patients currently pay close to $40,000 a year.241
The number of patents surrounding Humira has long been the subject of
discussion. In a 2015 presentation, AbbVie’s CEO, Richard Gonzalez, detailed
the company’s strategy to protect Humira’s “broad patent estate” in the United
States,242 which entailed keeping Humira’s intellectual property alive for as long
as possible,243 as well as continuing to pursue new indications for which Humira
could gain FDA approval.244 At the time of Gonzalez’s presentation, there were
over seventy patents covering Humira set to expire between 2016 and 2034.245
Crucially, the most significant patent in the estate—the one covering its
composition—was set to expire on December 31, 2016, in the United States,
thus ushering in the beginning of the end for Humira’s patent estate.246
Ordinarily, the expiration of the patent covering Humira’s composition—
combined with a series of challenges to Humira’s secondary patents—would
have enabled follow-on competitors to start competing with AbbVie
immediately after the expiration date of the composition patent. In fact, the FDA

236

U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382 (issued July 18, 2000) (listing an expiration date of December 31, 2016).
Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-shield-of-patentsprotects-the-world-s-best-selling-drug. To be sure, Humira is not the only biologic with a patent estate in the
triple digits. Remicade—a biologic manufactured by Janssen (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson), which also
targets several inflammatory diseases—is another example of this phenomenon. Id.
238
Mukherjee, supra note 178; see also Danny Hakim, Humira’s Best-Selling Drug Formula: Start at a
High Price. Go Higher, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/business/humira-drugprices.html.
239
Mukherjee, supra note 178.
240
ASS’N ACCESSIBLE MED., ENSURING THE FUTURE OF ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES IN THE U.S. 14 (2018)
[hereinafter ENSURING THE FUTURE OF ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES IN THE U.S.], https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/
default/files/2018-02/AAM-Whitepaper-Ensuring-Future-of-Generic-Medicines.pdf.
241
See Hakim, supra note 238.
242
RICHARD GONZALEZ, ABBVIE, ABBVIE LONG-TERM STRATEGY 14–15 (2015); see infra Part III.A.2.
243
GONZALEZ, supra note 242, at 13.
244
Id. at 11, 17.
245
See Koons, supra note 237 (noting AbbVie’s projected duration of Humira’s intellectual property
amounts to “more than double the protection span a drug such as Humira might normally expect”).
246
See infra Appendix 1 (providing an overview of Humira’s patent estate).
237
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started approving Humira biosimilars in 2016, and it continues to do so, having
approved four biosimilars to date.247
However, contrary to expectations and to the normal flow of biologicbiosimilar competition, no Humira biosimilars have entered the U.S. market.
Starting in 2017, AbbVie began pursuing a strategy that allows the company to
remain the sole manufacturer of Humira in the United States by entering into
agreements with biosimilar manufacturers that effectively delay
commercialization of any products competing with Humira until 2023.248 At the
same time, these agreements allow AbbVie’s competitors to sell their
biosimilars in Europe. The following sections detail the chronology and
substance of these agreements and explain their competition-distorting effects.
2. Anticompetitive Agreements
As seen above, AbbVie’s strategy to maintain Humira’s market share entails
taking advantage of a large patent portfolio while exploring new indications for
which Humira might be prescribed. Importantly, AbbVie’s intellectual property
strategy relies on two fronts: first, the number of staggered patents surrounding
Humira; and second, the company’s ability to fend off lawsuits challenging the
validity of the remaining patents.
From a quantitative perspective, the sheer number of patents related to
Humira constitutes a thicket that is hard to break. The rate at which AbbVie
applied for, and was granted, patents on Humira-related technology spiked in
the years prior to the expiration of the composition patent: in 2015 alone, thirtytwo patents were issued, followed by twenty-one in 2016, the last full year in
which Humira’s composition was patented.249 In the United States alone,
AbbVie applied for 247 patents related to Humira technology, 89% of which
were submitted to the PTO after receiving FDA approval for its original
indication.250
247
FDA Approves Hadlima, Fourth Humira Biosimilar, HEALIO (July 24, 2019), https://www.healio.com/
news/rheumatology/20190724/fda-approves-hadlima-fourth-humira-biosimilar.
248
See infra Appendix 2 (providing a chronology of the settlements).
249
See infra Appendix 1.
250
U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge, Comment Letter on FTC
Hearing #4 on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century and Industry Perspectives on
Innovation and IP Policy 2 (Dec. 21, 2018) [Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge], https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-2018-0090-d-0029-163403.pdf; see also Ned
Pagliarulo, Humira Biosimilars Launch in Europe, Testing AbbVie, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/abbvie-humira-biosimilars-launch-europe/539938/#:~:text=Mylan%20
announced%20Friday%20it%20has,Mylan%20said%20in%20its%20statement (noting that AbbVie applied for
over three times more Humira-related patents in the United States than in Europe).
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From a qualitative perspective, even if some of the patents in the Humira
estate were deemed invalid, the company would be taking advantage of the fact
that the invalidation process is time- and resource-consuming. When asked
about possible challenges to Humira’s secondary patents, AbbVie’s CEO
emphasized that “[t]he strategy that we have in place is not one that hinges on
one or two patents.”251
A salient component of the company’s intellectual property management
plan consists of adopting a protracted litigation strategy. In 2016, as Humira’s
composition patent in the United States252 was coming to an end, and a month
before the FDA approved the first Humira biosimilar, AbbVie sued the wouldbe competitor for infringement of ten Humira-related patents.253 In the
complaint, AbbVie identified an additional sixty-one patents, but stated that it
was not pursuing those as a matter of infringement for the time being.254 The
strategy gave AbbVie the possibility of initiating a different lawsuit at a later
time, hence protracting litigation on Humira. If more patents continued to be
invalidated or expired or if the biosimilar manufacturer was found not to be
infringing on existent patents, AbbVie could then bring another lawsuit, which
would in practice prevent the biosimilar from being commercialized in the
United States.
This strategy, which lasted just over a year, then morphed into a string of
contractual arrangements with would-be competitors that directly sought to
shelter Humira from competition in the United States market. On September 28,
2017, AbbVie announced it had entered into an agreement255 with the
manufacturer of the first biosimilar to Humira, an American pharmaceutical
company called Amgen.256 Even though Amgen’s biosimilar had been licensed
by the FDA to be marketed in the United States, Amgen agreed to delay its
commercialization until January 2023.257 Per the terms of the agreement, Amgen
251

Koons, supra note 237.
In Europe, the patent expired in June 2017. See Adalimumab Biosimilar Imraldi Makes Waves in
Europe, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2019), http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/General/
Adalimumab-biosimilar-Imraldi-makes-waves-in-Europe.
253
See Ed Silverman, AbbVie and Amgen Lock Horns in the Latest Squabble over Biosimilars, STAT
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/08/08/abbvie-amgen-biosimilars-patent/.
254
Complaint at 1, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00666-UNA (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2017).
255
See Jessica Dye, AbbVie Makes Peace with Amgen over Humira Patents, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/ff1dea83-cbf8-321b-8a59-2fc96158c546.
256
Amgen manufactures both biologics and biosimilars. See Ned Pagliarulo, 7 Companies to Know in the
Emerging Biosimilars Field, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/7companies-to-know-in-the-emerging-biosimilars-field/433539/.
257
Amgen’s biosimilar was approved in September 2016, a year before the agreement between AbbVie
and Amgen. See infra Appendix 2.
252
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would nonetheless start commercializing the biosimilar in Europe in October
2018.258 Moreover, Amgen agreed to sell its biosimilar in Europe under a nonexclusive license, which gave AbbVie the ability to pursue additional licensing
deals with other biosimilar manufacturers.259
In the meantime, the FDA continued to approve biosimilars to Humira. A
second biosimilar was approved in 2017,260 and a third in 2018.261 A fourth
biosimilar was approved in early 2019.262 Several other biosimilar companies
signaled their readiness to enter the market, and several are expected to
successfully navigate the FDA licensure process in the near future.263 Again—
in theory—the existence of FDA-licensed products should have meant that
multiple biosimilars would have entered the market and competed with Humira.
That was not the case.
In 2018, AbbVie struck six additional deals with biosimilar manufacturers.
As with Amgen’s biosimilar, these six would-be competitors agreed not to sell
their products in the United States until 2023 but are free to commercialize them
immediately in the European market. Two other deals took place in 2019,264
bringing the total to nine agreements that effectively eliminate competition for
Humira in the United States for over five years: the first agreement (with
Amgen) was signed on September 28, 2017, with an agreed entry date in the
U.S. market set for January 31, 2023; the remaining entry dates for the other
eight biosimilars range between June 30 and December 15, 2023.265
As of early 2020, five of the nine biosimilar manufacturers entering into
agreements with AbbVie have not obtained FDA approval for their product.
Among the ones that have successfully completed the licensure process, one
stands out. Sandoz, the manufacturer of a biosimilar to Humira called Hyrimoz,
struck a deal with AbbVie on October 11, 2018, agreeing to delay
commercialization of the product in the United States until September 30,
2023.266 The FDA licensed Hyrimoz on October 31, 2018, nearly three weeks
after the agreement.267 As one commentator aptly put it, the Agency “gave the

258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

See infra Appendix 2.
See infra Appendix 2.
See infra Appendix 2 (Cyltezo, manufactured by Boehringer).
See infra Appendix 2 (Hyrimoz, manufactured by Sandoz).
See infra Appendix 2 (Hadlima, manufactured by Samsung Bioepis).
See Pollack, supra note 173.
See Dunn, supra note 6.
See infra Appendix 2.
See infra Appendix 2.
See infra Appendix 2.
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green light” in 2018 to a product “that will not be
available . . . until . . . 2023.”268 This is not to say that the FDA was wrong in
approving the biosimilar—although Part IV examines the problem from the
perspective of the Agency and argues that the FDA can and should act
remedially in situations like this one.269 Rather, it underscores how industry
behavior can not only prolong legally sanctioned monopolies beyond their
expected duration, but also deprive permissive gestures from regulatory
agencies of their full meaning.270
In addition to both the anticompetitive nature of the agreements between
biologic and biosimilar manufacturers and the outcome of the FDA licensure
process, AbbVie’s strategy to maintain its stronghold on Humira’s
commercialization bears direct influence on intellectual property processes,
particularly those involving the invalidation of improperly granted patents, a
topic that this Article addresses in the following section.
As noted at the end of the next Part,271 the agreements between AbbVie and
several biosimilar manufacturers were eventually challenged in mid-2019 on
antitrust and consumer protection grounds.272 But it is important to note here that
the first legal challenge to these agreements arose over two years after the key
patent on Humira expired. For that period of time, AbbVie retained its
monopolistic position in the market, even though the legal mechanisms that
initially gave the company the power to exclude competitors were no longer
present. The next subsection briefly explores the consequences of this lack of
legal intervention.
3. Consequences of Anticompetitive Agreements
In 2018, AbbVie increased the price of Humira by 9.7%.273 The following
year, there was a price hike of 6.2%.274 And, in January 2020, AbbVie again
268
Alex Keown, FDA Approves Humira Biosimilar That Won’t Be Available Until 2023, BIOSPACE (Nov.
1, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/fda-approves-humira-biosimilar-that-won-t-be-available-until2023/.
269
See infra Part IV.B.
270
See infra Part IV.C.3 (arguing that FDA licensure of pharmaceuticals whose sponsors have entered
into certain competition-restricting agreements is problematic if the Agency does not have, or does not exercise,
the ability to intervene remedially, specifically by revoking the license).
271
See infra Part IV.A.4.
272
See Class Action Complaint at 2, UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund v. AbbVie Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99782 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 19–cv–01873) [hereinafter UFCW Complaint].
273
ENSURING THE FUTURE OF ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES IN THE U.S., supra note 240, at 12.
274
Bob Herman, 2019’s Drug Price Hikes Are Here, AXIOS (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.axios.com/drugprice-increases-2019-fba56e62-8737-40c5-8cd7-57e9d5bbf5f6.html.
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raised the price by more than 7%.275 While Humira price hikes have long
occurred on a yearly basis,276 2018 marked the first time that AbbVie increased
the price after entering into the first of its agreements with biosimilar
manufacturers. At that point, the main patent covering Humira had been expired
for at least a year.277 Keeping in mind that Humira is currently priced at close to
$40,000 per year after rebates or $50,000 if there are none,278 the post-patent
absence of competition poses very serious economic consequences for patients,
as well as for the healthcare system. One study, for instance, estimated that the
9.7% increase in 2018 will have added $1.2 billion in costs to the healthcare
system in the United States.279
As Humira’s patent protection began thinning out in late 2016, worldwide
sales began declining. Data pertaining to the first quarter of 2019 show that
global sales of Humira decreased by 5.6%.280 That decline, however, is due to
biosimilar competition outside the United States. Starting in 2018, the same
biosimilar that companies had agreed not to commercialize in the United States
began entering the European market, as per the terms of the agreements with
AbbVie.281
In Europe, the uptake of biosimilars was quick. Take the case of Imraldi, the
fourth biosimilar to Humira approved by the FDA in the United States.282
Imraldi was approved by the European Commission in August 2018 and reached
the market the following October.283 By November, it had acquired 62% of the
market share in Germany,284 which had traditionally been Humira’s largest
European market.285
275
Michael Erman, More January U.S. Price Hikes Take 2020 Tally to over 330 Drugs with Higher Cost,
REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-drugpricing/more-january-u-s-pricehikes-take-2020-tally-to-over-330-drugs-with-higher-cost-idUSKBN1Z11C9.
276
This phenomenon raises questions in itself, although outside the scope of this Article.
277
See infra Appendix 1.
278
See Pollack, supra note 173.
279
Jackie Syrop, Latest Humira Price Increase Could Add $1 Billion to US Healthcare System in 2018,
CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/latest-humira-price-increasecould-add-1-billion-to-us-healthcare-system-in-2018 (noting that the calculations were based on Humira’s
revenue generated in the United States market, which at the time was averaging $12.6 billion per year).
280
Mukherjee, supra note 178.
281
See Alex Keown, Dissimilar to U.S. Market, Humira Biosimilar Competition Launches in Europe,
BIOSPACE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/dissimilar-to-u-s-market-humira-biosimilarcompetition-launches-in-europe/.
282
See infra Appendix 2.
283
See Adalimumab Biosimilar Imraldi Makes Waves in Europe, supra note 252.
284
Id.
285
Id. (reporting that in the year prior to facing biosimilar competition, sales in Germany accounted for
28% of Humira’s European market).
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The first three biosimilars to Humira launched in Europe in October 2018.286
As a result, prices came down between 10% to 80% across Europe287 when
compared to those charged by AbbVie for Humira before facing biosimilar
competition. The Nordic countries registered the steepest discounts,288 while
countries like the United Kingdom saw variation in the range of 15% to 35%.289
As a result of biosimilar competition, AbbVie itself has lowered the price of
Humira in Europe both to preserve a modicum of market share and to comply
with varying pricing rules set by national authorities.290 As with its competitors
in Europe, AbbVie’s discounts span the range of 10% to 80%, with AbbVie’s
CEO stating in late 2018 that “discounting has been on the higher end.”291
Put simply, the biological product needed by patients taking Humira in the
United States is supplied at often deeply discounted prices in the European
market, with discounts being offered by, among others, the same company that
charges increasingly higher prices to American consumers.
The first set of problems are thus of an economic nature, resulting in unfair
treatment of consumers—who are also patients—in the United States.
Additionally, suppressing competition in a market already distorted by patent
and regulatory exclusivities raises questions from the perspective of innovation
policy. The prolongment of AbbVie’s de facto monopoly circumvents the legal
architecture of R&D incentives in the biopharmaceutical arena. AbbVie’s
market position is extended through contractual fiat even after the statutory
market-distorting and innovation-enhancing292 distortions to the market have
ended.

286

See Pagliarulo, supra note 250.
See Ladika, supra note 3.
288
Zachary Brennan, AbbVie Sees 80% Discounts in Nordic Market with New Humira Biosimilars, RAPS
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/11/abbvie-sees-80-discounts-innordic-market-with-ne.
289
Pagliarulo, supra note 250.
290
See Samantha DiGrande, Are Rumors of AbbVie’s Humira Price Cuts What They Seem?, CTR. FOR
BIOSIMILARS (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/are-rumors-of-abbvies-humira-pricecuts-what-they-seem (noting that several European countries have rules in place that require the manufacturer
of the reference product to lower its price, or match that of competitors, after biosimilars enter the market).
291
Brennan, supra note 288.
292
Patents and regulatory exclusivities have long been understood as interventions designed to promote
innovation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (taking an inherently limiting approach to patent rights, which are
granted “for limited times” and with the purpose “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts”). This Article is
agnostic on this proposition and merely notes that the goal of promoting innovation is not supported by current
industry practices, some of which have gone unchecked for significant periods of time.
287
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Moreover, there are systemic consequences likely to stretch beyond the
realm of Humira. In the future, AbbVie’s strategy may operate as a blueprint for
large biologic manufacturers wishing to preserve post-patent and postexclusivity market share. As a consequence, there may be fewer challenges to
secondary patents, among which there is a greater likelihood of weaknesses
affecting patent validity. The first agreement pursued by AbbVie, with
biosimilar manufacturer Amgen, happened on the heels of patent challenges—
and it functioned precisely as a challenge stopper.293
Additional challenges to Humira’s patent estate, brought by other biosimilar
manufacturers, also came to a halt as AbbVie entered into these agreements. For
example, the case of California biosimilar manufacturer Coherus challenged
several patents covering Humira’s dosing regimen in 2016.294 The Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the PTO struck down the patents in 2017.295 In
January 2019, Coherus entered into an agreement with AbbVie, agreeing to
delay commercialization of its biosimilar to Humira until 2023 in the United
States while marketing it non-exclusively in other markets, as well as agreeing
to cease all intellectual property litigation related to Humira.296 A few months
later, Boehringer Ingelheim, a German manufacturer whose biosimilar to
Humira gained FDA approval in 2017, entered into a similar agreement with
AbbVie that included the obligation to drop all challenges to Humira’s patent
estate.297 Boehringer was the ninth would-be competitor to settle with
AbbVie.298 With this final agreement, all patent challenges to Humira came to
an end.
The opportunity cost of stopping these patent challenges might never be fully
appreciated. Ongoing litigation was based on secondary patents, but some of

293
See Nicholas Mitrokostas & Elaine Blais, End of a Humira Battle: Observations from the AbbVieAmgen Armistice, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/end-of-ahumira-battle-observations-from-the-abbvie-amgen-armistice-0001.
294
See Pagliarulo, supra note 9.
295
PTAB Invalidates AbbVie’s Humira Dosing Patent — Again, FDA NEWS (July 10, 2017),
https://www.fdanews.com/articles/182553-ptab-invalidates-abbvies-humira-dosing-patent-again.
296
Coherus BioSciences Announces Global Settlement with AbbVie Securing Rights to Commercialize Its
Adalimumab Biosimilar Candidate, CHS-1420, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.
biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/coherus-biosciences-announces-global-settlement-candidate-0001.
297
AbbVie and Boehringer Ingelheim Settle over Biosimilar Adalimumab, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (May
14,
2019),
https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/abbvie-and-boehringer-ingelheim-settle-overbiosimilar-adalimumab; see also Boehringer’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims at 44–45, AbbVie Inc. v.
Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GMBH, No. 17-cv-1065 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Boehringer’s Answer,
Defenses, and Counterclaims] (listing Boehringer’s contentions, prior to settlement, that several of Humira’s
secondary patents were weak, “derived from the prior art,” and “d[id] not represent innovation”).
298
AbbVie and Boehringer Ingelheim Settle over Biosimilar Adalimumab, supra note 297.
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those patents were challenged and invalidated. As a result of the plethora of
agreements AbbVie entered into, courts and adjudicatory bodies are now
unlikely to have the opportunity to review other potentially weak or unworthy
patents still active in Humira’s estate.
Collectively, the problems referenced in this section stem from an entityspecific behavior while the patent landscape for many blockbuster biologics
undergoes significant changes. However, Humira is not an isolated case when it
comes to surrounding a drug with thickets of patents. A report surveying the 12
top-grossing drugs in the United States in 2017 found that an average of 125
patent applications are filed per drug and an average of 71 patents are granted
per drug.299 Similarly, price increases among blockbuster drugs are the norm.
Since 2012, only one of these twelve drugs has decreased in price while
collectively prices have increased by 68%.300 All of these drugs, like Humira,
have been on the market for well over a decade.301 The precedent set by
AbbVie’s string of anticompetitive agreements, if left unchecked, offers an
easily replicable strategy for future competition-restricting behaviors by
biologics manufacturers wishing to preserve their exclusionary power in the
post-patent world at the expense of patient populations.
4. Lawsuits Challenging the Validity of Pay-for-Delay Deals
The validity of the agreements to delay the entrance of Humira competitors
into the United States market was eventually challenged in the first half of
2019.302 As of early 2020, there were six lawsuits targeting AbbVie and the
biosimilar companies involved in these deals.303
On March 18, UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, a New York-based
employee welfare benefits fund,304 initiated a putative class action lawsuit305
claiming that AbbVie engaged in “unlawful market division agreements” to keep

299
I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING IS EXTENDING
MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES 6 (2018), https://www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/IMAK-Overpatented-Overpriced-Report.pdf.
300
Id. at 2, 6.
301
Id.
302
Susannah Luthi, AbbVie Sued over Humira ‘Patent Thicket’, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/politics-policy/abbvie-sued-over-humira-patent-thicket.
303
Zachary Brennan, Six Lawsuits Target AbbVie’s Humira and Its Patent Thicket, RAPS (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2019/4/six-lawsuits-target-abbvies-humira-and-itspatent.
304
UFCW Complaint, supra note 272, at 9.
305
Id. at 30–31.
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Humira competition at bay until 2023.306 Reiterating claims by the biosimilar
companies who had previously challenged some of Humira’s secondary
patents,307 the lawsuit emphasizes the weakness of many secondary patents
covering Humira308 and contends that AbbVie leveraged Humira’s patent thicket
to delay biosimilar competition in the United States from 2017 onward.309 The
complaint also asserts that the agreements are anticompetitive because they
result in an “unlawful market division” between Europe and the United States.310
Further, the complaint notes that the duality in patent litigation strategy in the
European and U.S. markets underscores the anticompetitive nature of these
agreements:
As in the U.S., AbbVie had Humira patent protection in Europe. But
AbbVie ceded the European market to biosimilar competition—
despite that patent protection—in exchange for maintaining its
monopoly in the U.S. . . . This trade-off meant that the lower price for
Humira in Europe was subsidized by the much higher price in the
United States where AbbVie unlawfully maintained its monopoly.311

UFCW claims that AbbVie and the manufacturers of biosimilars to Humira
entered into unlawful market division agreements in violation of the Sherman
Act.312 The complaint further claims that AbbVie engaged in monopolization313
by unduly keeping a 100% market share for adalimumab (the active ingredient
in Humira) in violation of federal antitrust law,314 as well as in violation of
multiple state laws;315 that AbbVie and the biosimilar manufacturers engaged in
conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade under multiple state laws;316 and

306

Id. at 5.
Boehringer’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, supra note 297, at 44–45.
308
UFCW Complaint, supra note 272, at 21–22.
309
Id. at 22.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 3, 22–23.
312
Id. at 34–35 (arguing that the agreements constitute a per se violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 and,
alternatively, that a rule of reason analysis would still indicate that the agreements were violative of federal
antitrust laws, given the revenue that the biosimilar manufacturers stand to gain from sales in the European
market).
313
Id. at 48–50; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2.
314
UFCW Complaint, supra note 272, at 49.
315
Id. at 55–58; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1401 to 44-1403 (LexisNexis 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35-24 to 35-30 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to 75-2.1 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–2461c
(2019).
316
UFCW Complaint, supra note 272, at 50–54; see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–16757
(2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-1 to 480-9 (LexisNexis 2020); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/3 to 10/9
(LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340–341 (McKinney 2019); WIS. STAT. § 133.03 (2019).
307
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that all parties to the agreements violated principles of unjust enrichment in
multiple states by overcharging members of the class action.317
Four days after the UFCW complaint was entered, the City of Baltimore
initiated a separate putative class action against AbbVie and only the first of the
biosimilar companies to enter into a settlement, Amgen.318 Four other putative
class actions also started around the same period.319
While the outcome of these lawsuits may break AbbVie’s monopoly in the
United States and infuse the market with more affordable alternatives to Humira,
it is important to note that more than two years had passed after the expiration
of the main patent on Humira when the first lawsuit was brought against
AbbVie,320 and that over a year and half had passed after the first settlement
between AbbVie and Amgen.321 If these class actions are to succeed, additional
time would pass. For Humira patients in the United States, the interim period is
far too long and available remedies are unlikely to fully account for the supracompetitive prices these patients have been paying since patent expiration and
FDA approval of biosimilars to Humira.322
In theory, the law has the appropriate mechanisms to scrutinize potentially
anticompetitive behavior—as well as to curb and penalize it—with antitrust
frameworks at the forefront of this scrutiny. In practice, however, antitrust
mechanisms tend to offer temporally protracted responses in situations like the
one addressed in the Humira case study.
In line with these propositions, this Article next offers a brief description of
the antitrust framework applicable to pay-for-delay deals and argues that, in
addition to antitrust, another type of legal intervention is required to address
these types of anticompetitive behaviors in an expeditious fashion.
317

UFCW Complaint, supra note 272, at 62–82.
Class Action Complaint, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. AbbVie Inc. (In re Humira
(Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig.), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99782 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (19-cv-02015).
319
All four of these putative class actions name only Amgen as co-defendant. See Class Action Complaint,
Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge v. AbbVie Inc. (In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig.), 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99782 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 19-cv-01933); Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demand,
Pipe Trades Servs. MN Welfare Fund v. AbbVie Inc. (In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig.), 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99782 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 19-cv-02182); Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, St.
Paul Electrical Workers’ Health Plan v. AbbVie Inc. (In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig.), 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99782 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 19-cv-02196); Class Action Complaint, Welfare Plan of the
International Union of Operating Engineers Locals v. AbbVie Inc., No. 19-cv-02226 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2019).
320
See infra Appendix 2.
321
See infra Appendix 2.
322
The same arguments hold true for the supra-competitive costs supported by the U.S. health system
during the same period of time.
318
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B. The Antitrust Framework to Address Pay-for-Delay Deals
The practice of delaying competition through settlements is not new, even
though AbbVie was the first company to employ this strategy in the context of
biologic-biosimilar competition. This Article now provides an overview of
similar behaviors in previous situations involving manufacturers of conventional
drugs and their generic competitors and briefly explains how the antitrust
principles governing these settlements are transferable to the context of biologicbiosimilar competition.
1. Pay-for-Delay in the Pre-Biologics Era
As seen in Part I, the abbreviated regulatory pathway introduced by the
Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to enable generic competitors to enter markets
as soon as relevant patents expired or were successfully challenged.323 In
previous situations, the equilibrium between patent protection and second-comer
competition was often disrupted by agreements between the manufacturer of a
conventional drug and its would-be generic competitor. These agreements,
which became known as “exclusion payment,” “reverse payment,” or “pay-fordelay” settlements,324 came to the attention of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in 2000, precisely when the first wave of patent term expirations for
blockbuster small-molecule drugs began unfolding.
In FTC v. Actavis, the landmark 2013 case on pharmaceutical pay-for-delay
settlements,325 the Supreme Court delineated the structure of these agreements
as follows:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed
infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of
dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged
infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement
agreement is often called a “reverse payment” settlement
agreement.326

Throughout the 2000s—and between the first and second waves of
expiration of pharmaceutical patents en masse—pay-for-delay became an

323
324
325
326

See Eisenberg, supra note 80.
2013 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 1.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
Id. at 140–41.
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increasingly popular strategy in the pharmaceutical industry.327 The number of
potential pay-for-delay settlements monitored by the FTC rose from three in
2005 to forty in 2012.328 In 2013, the FTC estimated that pay-for-delay was
costing consumers in the United States an average of $3.5 billion per year.329
The classic pay-for-delay scheme is embodied in Actavis. The case involved
AndroGel, a form of synthetic testosterone manufactured by Solvay
Pharmaceuticals.330 Generic drug manufacturers, including Actavis, filed an
abbreviated new drug application with the FDA, certifying that the AndroGel
formulation patent331 listed in the Agency’s Orange Book332 was invalid and that
no patent infringement would occur upon commercialization of their generic
products.333 Solvay sued the generic companies.334 After thirty months, and per
Hatch-Waxman rules, the FDA approved Actavis’s first-to-file application in the
pendency of patent litigation.335 Instead of entering the market, Actavis and
other generic companies settled with Solvay in 2006, agreeing to delay
commercialization until 2015 in exchange for large sums of money.336 Solvay
paid between $12 million and $60 million to other generic manufacturers and

327

See 2013 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 4.
Id. The year 2013 constitutes a relevant marker in this chronology, as it was the year in which the
Supreme Court first addressed pay-for-delay in the context of pharmaceuticals. See Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
329
Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission) (noting the detrimental economic impact of these
settlements on governmental health programs like Medicare and Medicaid); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAYFOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federaltrade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent
Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L., SCI., & TECH. 3, 8 (2014) (noting that,
under a pay-for-delay agreement, “[f]ormally, consumer welfare remains the same as it would be under
continued monopoly production by a single firm”).
330
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ANDROGEL, https://www.fda.gov/media/80632/download (May 2015);
see Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Announces Submission of Supplemental New Drug Application for
AndroGel(R) in Male Adolescents, BIOSPACE (June 14, 2007), https://www.biospace.com/article/releases/
solvay-pharmaceuticals-inc-announces-submission-of-supplemental-new-drug-application-for-androgel-r-inmale-adolescents-/.
331
U.S. Patent No. 6,503,894 (issued Jan. 7, 2003) (covering AndroGel’s formulation). AndroGel’s
composition was not patented.
332
The FDA’s Orange Book is a list of drugs approved by the Agency under its statutory mandate. The
list includes information about patents covering the drugs listed in the Book. See Orange Book: Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
333
Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 144–46 (2013).
334
Id.
335
Id. at 145.
336
Id.
328
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between $19 million and $30 million annually to Actavis for a period of nine
years.337
In 2009, the FTC filed a complaint claiming multiple violations of the
Sherman and FTC Acts.338 The FTC noted that “by deferring competition, the
parties would preserve monopoly rents that could be shared amongst them—at
the expense of the consumer savings that would result from price
competition.”339 Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit, however,
dismissed the complaint.340 The Eleventh Circuit ruled in 2012 that a pay-fordelay agreement is “immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”341 The
following year, the Supreme Court held that pay-for-delay behavior “can
sometimes violate the antitrust laws” and therefore the complaint should have
been allowed to proceed.342
2. The Actavis Framework for Pay-for-Delay Agreements
In 2013, the Supreme Court took the view in Actavis that large and otherwise
unjustified payments flowing from a pharmaceutical company to would-be
competitors “can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects.”343
Pay-for-delay agreements are thus subject to antitrust scrutiny.344 Further, the
Court in Actavis held that the antitrust analysis is separate from, and does not
have to probe into, the validity of the patents associated with the drug in
question.345 The Court also noted the need for a contextual analysis of a given
reverse payment:
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services
for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other

337

Id.
Civil Complaint – Public Version at 27–28, FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).
339
Id. at 14.
340
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141; FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
341
Watson Pharms., 677 F.3d at 1312.
342
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141.
343
Id. at 158.
344
Id. at 151, 158.
345
Id. at 147–49; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 329, at 3 (noting that “courts assessing the antitrust
illegality of [pay-for-delay] agreements need not evaluate the patent’s validity or infringement”).
338
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convincing justification. The existence and degree of any
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.346

While the Actavis framework dealt with potentially anticompetitive practices
involving cash payments, both pre- and post-Actavis case law indicate that other
types of behavior in pay-for-delay deals can amount to anticompetitive behavior.
For instance, in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled in 1990
that an agreement between competitors to cease competing is considered
“anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a market within which
both do business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another
for the other.”347 Since Actavis, courts have directly addressed the problem of
in-kind or non-cash payments.348 In 2016, for example, the First Circuit in In re
Loestrin reversed a district court ruling interpreting Actavis to apply only to
monetary payments.349 And, in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., the Third Circuit analyzed a case in which “payment” consisted
of early entrance into the market for chewable anticonvulsant drugs, coupled
with the brand-name manufacturer’s promise not to produce its own generic
version of the drug, and held that such a combo met the Actavis threshold.350 As
the court put it, even in cases in which consideration is not purely monetary, “an
unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value from the patentee to
the alleged infringer . . . may . . . give rise to the inference that it is a payment to
eliminate the risk of competition.”351
In spite of occasional misapplications at the lower court level,352 Actavis is
widely seen as a turning point in the field of pharmaceutical competition. Since
Actavis was decided, the number of pay-for-delay deals has decreased.353

346
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159. The FTC had previously maintained that pay-for-delay deals were
presumptively unlawful. Id. Commentators have noted that the Court in Actavis did not fully adopt a rule of
reason approach. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in the Post-Actavis World, 2018 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 25, 38 (2018); Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule of Reason Not the Rule
of Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L., SCI., & TECH. 41, 41–43 (2014).
347
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990).
348
See Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 8–11 (2014) (analyzing non-cash
forms of consideration in pay-for-delay deals).
349
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 542 (1st Cir. 2016).
350
See King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015).
351
Id. at 394.
352
See Michael Carrier, How Not to Apply Actavis, 109 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 113, 113–14 (2014)
(criticizing district court rulings in In re Lamictal and In re Loestrin for misapplication of the Actavis
framework).
353
Michael Carrier, FTC v. Actavis: Where We Stand After 5 Years, IP WATCHDOG (June 18, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/18/ftc-v-actavis-stand-5-years/id=98536/ (suggesting that antitrust
scrutiny has functioned as a deterrent to pay-for-delay agreements).
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Even though Actavis was decided with reference to conventional drugs, there
is no reason not to apply Actavis to biologics on account of the structural
differences between the two types of drugs.354 In the context of biologicbiosimilar competition, the skeletal elements of pay-for-delay remain the same
as the ones enunciated by the Actavis court, as seen in the Humira case study
above.355 There are, however, characteristics innate to antitrust interventions that
render the current legal framework for curbing anticompetitive behaviors an
unwieldy and often ineffective response to the harms caused to patients and
health systems by pay-for-delay agreements between pharmaceutical
companies. This Article now turns to the downside of reliance on antitrust
frameworks to curb these behaviors, with a particular focus on the detrimental
effects it poses to biologic-biosimilar competition as patent protection for the
former thins out.
3. Shortcomings of the Antitrust Framework
No single branch of law aseptically regulates competitive behaviors in
markets for pharmaceutical drugs. As Michael Carrier and Carl Minniti have
observed, this is a field in which antitrust, patent law, and a heterogeneous body
of regulations intersect with extra-legal factors,356 ranging from economics to
public policy.357 Yet, from a perspective of addressing potentially
anticompetitive occurrences, antitrust remains the primary legal tool for dealing
with issues like those presented by pay-for-delay deals.358
Responses offered by the application of antitrust principles, however, have
to contend with several problems, from overreliance on concepts of efficiency

354
Carrier & Minniti, supra note 13, at 24 (stating “regulation under the BPCIA easily offers sufficient
similarities to the Hatch-Waxman Act to allow application of Actavis’s broad principles”).
355
See supra Part III.A.
356
Carrier & Minniti, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry lies at the intersection
of patent law, antitrust law, federal and state regulations, and complex markets”); see also PATRICIA M. DANZON,
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 3 (2014).
357
See generally STUART O. SCHWEITZER & Z. JOHN LU, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY:
PERSPECTIVES, PROMISES, AND PROBLEMS (2018) (providing overview of the pharmaceutical industry in health
systems around the world); Frederic M. Scherer, Pharmaceutical Innovation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS
OF INNOVATION (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (describing the R&D process underlying
the production and approval of new pharmaceutical products); Michael Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the
Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2008) (examining
structural features of R&D markets).
358
See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW (4th
ed. 2020); Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182
(1981) (framing the role of antitrust law as promoting multiple goals, among which is the “protection of the
competition process as market governor”).
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to definitional problems posed by the concept of market power.359 In the
pharmaceutical arena in particular, the application of antitrust law is further
complicated by the complexity of markets and regulatory regimes.360 Moreover,
underlying the specificities of pharmaceutical antitrust is the temporal nature of
antitrust interventions in cases like pay-for-delay: Actavis offers the possibility
of ex post scrutiny, but that scrutiny is bound to take place after a significant
period of time—and will consequently lead to protracted harmful behavior
affecting patients in need of biopharmaceutical products. The case study on
Humira illustrated this shortcoming of the remedial facet of antitrust: while the
FDA approved the first biosimilar to Humira in 2016, anticipating a 2017 market
entrance,361 it was not until March 2019 that the first antitrust lawsuits were
brought.362 Similarly, there was a time lag in previous pay-for-delay deals: the
Actavis settlement took place in 2006, but it took almost three years for the FTC
to initiate litigation against the parties involved in the deal.363
The delayed nature of antitrust responses is of heightened relevance in the
context of pay-for-delay involving biologic products for two reasons. First, the
reference drugs affected by the ongoing wave of patent expiration, both
presently and in the foreseeable future, are among the most promising available
to patients suffering from serious diseases,364 including several types of cancers,
multiple sclerosis, diabetes, asthma, and different forms of arthritis.365 Second,
these drugs are some of the most expensive ever to come to the U.S. market.366
Maintaining artificially high prices in the post-patent, post-exclusivity market
generates detrimental effects of a magnitude that patients and health systems had
not experienced before.

359
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001) (arguing for an efficiency-centric approach
to antitrust regulation); Fox, supra note 358, at 1176–77 (surveying the centrality of efficiency arguments in
antitrust scholarship); Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV 1303, 1305 (2017)
(exploring the multiple functions of market power in competition law and policy). For a critique of current
antitrust law, see generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).
360
See Michael A. Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 615,
638 (2020).
361
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
362
See supra Part III.A.4.
363
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 145 (2013).
364
See Jallal, supra note 169 (observing that “[t]he future of biologics and its growing potential to benefit
patients with unmet medical needs has perhaps never been more promising”); see also Mullin, supra note 175
(emphasizing the high cost of the latest generation of gene therapies).
365
See Jallal, supra note 169; see also H.A. Daniel Lagassé et al., Recent Advances in (Therapeutic
Protein) Drug Development, 6 F1000RESEARCH 113, 115, 118–121 (2017) (exemplifying the growing domains
into which research on therapeutic proteins is expanding).
366
See supra Part II.A.
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The final Part of this Article links this magnitude of detrimental effects to
the need for regulatory interventions to curb pay-for-delay outside the realm of
antitrust. It explains why antitrust law and antitrust regulators should not be the
sole players tasked with corrective functions in cases of pay-for-delay.
Expanding on this idea, this Article argues for a greater ex post role for a
different regulator with institutional, statutory, and policy capacity to influence
competitive behaviors—the FDA.
IV. BEYOND ANTITRUST: A NOVEL SOLUTION FOR ADDRESSING
ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR
So far, this Article has described the challenges faced by the branch of the
law specifically designed to address anticompetitive behaviors in responding to
pay-for-delay agreements. It now turns to a solution outside the realm of antitrust
that could serve as a deterrent for this type of behavior: it argues that the FDA
is well-placed to address some of the failures that currently plague biosimilar
competition. It posits that, by granting licenses that result in no product
commercialization, FDA’s role as an administrative agency is reduced to an
empty gesture. This Part argues that the FDA has both the statutory authority
and the obligation to revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-delay. This
solution is also consistent with policy goals: given the Agency’s role as a locus
for innovation policy, the FDA should apply the licensing revocation framework
to cases of pay-for-delay as a way to encourage motivated manufacturers to seek
regulatory approval for their products, while compelling inactive players to clear
the field for legitimate competition.
Section A summarizes the need for regulatory interventions outside the field
of antitrust in order to address pay-for-delay in the context of biologic-biosimilar
competition. Section B makes the case that the FDA is institutionally wellplaced to address the problem. Section C argues that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the FDA can and should revoke biosimilar licenses when
manufacturers fail to produce the approved product within a reasonable
timeframe. Section C also outlines the proposed regime, detailing its mechanics
and possible forms of implementation, as well as exploring the advantages and
drawbacks of license revocation with regard to biosimilar competition.
A. The Need for Cumulative Regulatory Interventions in the Drug Patent
Ecosystem
As seen above, the current wave of patent expiration is different from the
previous ones because it affects a type of drug that was relatively rare until the
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twenty-first century.367 In addition to their immediate applications and future
promise, biologics come at a price tag significantly higher than that of
conventional drugs. Some commentators have observed that the price savings
attributable to biosimilar competition are more “modest” than those triggered by
generic competition in the conventional drug space.368 Generic versions of
conventional drugs translate into savings in the 80% range, both in the United
States and Europe.369 Due to manufacturing constraints370 and costlier regulatory
review when compared to generics,371 the European market372 has registered
savings in connection with the introduction of biosimilars that are relatively
lower: one study estimated average savings across Europe at around 25%.373
While this is a relevant component of the economics of biosimilar
competition, an important element is missing from this analysis: aggregate
savings from biosimilars are not insignificant. Even when taking only into
account the average biosimilar discount in the European market, saving a quarter
of the price of a biologic is not negligible from the perspective of patients,
insurers, and health systems. Moreover, as seen in the case of Humira, in some
cases biosimilar competition has triggered discounts of as little as 10% and as
high as 80% in different European countries.374 Bearing in mind that Humira has
a price tag of $38,000 per year after rebates,375 the positive social welfare impact
of actual biosimilar competition in the United States market should not be
minimized. As a report from the FTC has put it: “Although not as steep a
discount as small-molecule generic drugs, a 10 to 30 percent discount on a
$48,000 drug product represents substantial consumer savings.”376
In addition to differences related to the economics of biosimilar competition,
the current landscape is also distinctive because patent thickets have grown
367

See Haydon, supra note 11.
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1028 (referencing data from the European market).
369
See Matthew Solan, Buying into Generic Drugs, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (July 25, 2016),
http://health.harvard.edu/blog/buying-generic-drugs-201607159982; see also Panos Kanavos, Do Generics
Offer Significant Savings to the U.K. National Health Service?, 23 CURRENT MED. RSCH. & OP. 103, 111 (2007)
(reporting savings on selected generics exceeding the 80% threshold in the United Kingdom).
370
Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1028.
371
Henry G. Grabowski, Rahul Guha & Maria Salgado, Regulatory and Cost Barriers Are Likely to Limit
Biosimilar Development and Expected Savings in the Near Future, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1048, 1050 (2014).
372
The European market is widely seen as the “global pioneer” in the introduction of biosimilars, which
is why it often used as the benchmark in this field. See Cécile Rémuzat, Julie Dorey, Olivier Cristeau, Dan
Ionescu, Guerric Radière & Mondher Toumi, Key Drivers for Market Penetration of Biosimilars in Europe, 5 J.
MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1, 1 (2017).
373
Mergelin et al., supra note 216, at 1805.
374
Ladika, supra note 287, at 8.
375
If there are no rebates, the price is closer to $50,000. See Pollack, supra note 173.
376
See EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES IN THE U.S., supra note 215, at v.
368
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worse.377 The case study on Humira does not portray an isolated phenomenon.
Data shows that the manufacturers of the eight largest-grossing biologics in the
United States applied for an average of 151 patents related to the biologic, with
80% of the applications occurring after FDA licensure.378 The numbers also
indicate that the average length for which these companies estimate to be able
to exclude biosimilar competitors is forty years, with actual periods varying
between thirty-one and forty-eight years.379 The higher end of these estimates
significantly outlasts the twenty years of patent protection and twelve of
regulatory exclusivity contemplated in the patent and FDA statutes.380
The problems triggered by pay-for-delay today thus exceed the domain of a
single branch of law. Because they raise anticompetitive concerns, they can be
configured as core antitrust problems.381 But that does not mean that antitrust
law and antitrust regulators are the sole entities capable of addressing behaviors
that unduly distort markets for pharmaceuticals.382 FDA law and patent law are
intertwined with antitrust law in the biopharmaceutical arena.383 Monitoring
pay-for-delay deals involving biosimilars should not be an activity restricted to
the FTC. The string of settlements surrounding biosimilars to Humira suggests
that Actavis’s deterrent power is, in some circumstances, limited. Against this
backdrop, the public interest would be furthered if additional agencies could add
to the FTC’s patrolling functions.
This Article thus argues in favor of cumulative ex post interventions from
different agencies, and proceeds to illustrate how one such intervention384 could

377
See James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 1 (Rsch. on
Innovation, Working Paper, 2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=327760 (describing the
emergence of patent thickets).
378
See Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge, supra note 250, at 2.
379
Id.
380
The two terms are unlikely to occur in linear succession, and the actual patent term itself is often shorter
for biopharmaceuticals. See Erika Lietzan & Kristina M.L. Acri, Distorted Drug Patents, WASH. L. REV
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 44), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3458588 (showing that, even after patent term
restoration, the effective life of patents covering pharmaceuticals is often shorter than fourteen years).
381
Hovenkamp, supra note 36 (noting that “[t]he primary purpose of antitrust law is to promote
competition”).
382
See, e.g., Khan, supra note 49 (noting that antitrust laws and regulators constitute only one tool in the
American anti-monopoly legal and institutional framework).
383
Carrier & Minniti, supra note 13, at 3; see also Jordan Paradise, Regulatory Silence at the FDA: Impact
on Access and Innovation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2383, 2384 (fleshing out the relationship between the FDA’s
regulatory activity and patent law).
384
There are other possible interventions that might be worth considering. For instance, a different way to
address the problem via the FDA—suggested to me by Mark Lemley, whom I thank for the idea—would consist
in conditioning continued FDA approval of the reference biologic drug on market entrance of biosimilar(s) as
of a certain date (which would be set a moment after the expiration of data exclusivity).
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and should take place. It focuses primarily on the FDA as the gatekeeper of
market entrance for biopharmaceutical products. It proposes a regime of license
revocation for manufacturers who deliberately fail to bring their biosimilars to
market after FDA approval. Such a solution eliminates the most troublesome
effects of the extended lag between anticompetitive settlements and antitrust
litigation and, in so doing, triages the marketplace for biosimilar competition.
B. FDA as a Locus for Addressing Competition Issues
Our collective understanding of the FDA changed considerably in the early
twenty-first century, as work by Rebecca Eisenberg385 and other scholars386
progressively shed light on the nuances of the roles played by the Agency as a
regulator of pharmaceutical products. No longer regarded purely as a gatekeeper
for safe and effective drugs, the FDA is now understood as a major catalyst for
the production of information about the products it regulates.387 As Amy
Kapczynski put it, the “core function” of the Agency in this field is to generate
and validate “high-quality information about medicines.”388
One aspect of the Agency’s programmatic design that remains underexplored is the position of the FDA as a distorter of competition. The ways in
which FDA’s actions affect competition have been primarily associated with the
incentives package embedded in FDA law that is available to biopharmaceutical
innovators and worthy follow-on innovators. The bulk of these incentives
consists of market exclusivities that vary according to the FDA-approved
product389 and translate into delays or prohibitions on the approval of competitor
products for a certain period of time.390 More recently, the FDA has been
directed to award priority review vouchers following the approval of drugs
385

See Eisenberg, supra note 56.
See generally Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past
and Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357 (2018); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010); PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL
& LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2014).
387
Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 347 (framing this “structural role” of the FDA as one of “promoting a
valuable form of pharmaceutical innovation—the development of credible information about the effects of
drugs”); Kapczynski, supra note 386, at 2358–59; Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement
Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2019) (noting that the FDA “is
institutionally well-positioned to serve as an information intermediary”); see also Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and
the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 627 (2014) (tracing the historical decline of the
paternalistic view of the FDA’s gatekeeping function).
388
Kapczynski, supra note 386, at 2358–59.
389
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.108, 316.31, 316.34 (2019); see Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and
Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 5, 2020), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approvalprocess-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity.
390
See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, supra note 389.
386
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targeting selected diseases391 as a way to incentivize R&D in traditionally
underfunded areas.392
The consequences of these incentives administered by the FDA bear a direct
impact on competition outcomes. Most notably, the exclusivity regime gives
drug manufacturers the ability to enter the market as monopoly-like players,
even in the absence of patent protection. At a different level, priority vouchers
shorten the timeline for regulatory review, thus allowing the bearer to enter the
market earlier than under standard review.
Even though the FDA yields significant competition-distorting power, so
far, the Agency has not been regarded as a potential corrective locus when
malfunctions arise in the context of biopharmaceutical competition.393 Yet, it is
worth considering the FDA as an institutional player with the capability to
address certain anticompetitive behaviors. The Agency is well-positioned to
curb excesses that distort competition, as a counterpart to its own power to
distort competition through the grant of exclusivities and vouchers.
The solution developed in the following section—license revocation—can
be seen, among other features, as a punitive gesture directly aimed at curtailing
anticompetitive behaviors like the ones embodied by pay-for-delay agreements.
But it can also be seen as a corollary of the FDA’s gatekeeping function. The
regulator that controls access to the market also exerts the faculty of restraining
previously granted market access, if an approved product fails to meet statutory
or regulatory standards while being commercialized. As such, the figure of
revocation would not be extraneous to FDA practice, nor to its mandate as an
administrative agency. Moreover, if the FDA were to play a more overt role in
competition policy than it does today, with the purpose of disincentivizing
behaviors like for pay-for-delay, this would be consistent with its public healthoriented mission.394

391
See David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Developing Drugs for Developing
Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 313, 313 (2006) (first proposing an FDA-administered voucher system).
392
For an overview and evaluation of the voucher program, see generally Ana Santos Rutschman, The
Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures
Act, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (2017).
393
In fact, the Agency has consistently declined to intervene in competition-related issues. See Michael
A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37 (2017) (noting
that “the FDA has conceded that ‘issues related to ensuring that marketplace actions are fair and do not block
competition would be best addressed by the FTC, which is the Federal entity most expert in investigating and
addressing anticompetitive business practices’”) (citation omitted).
394
See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-wdo (listing the ways in which the Agency pursues public health goals).
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As far as biosimilars are concerned, the FDA itself has self-diagnosed the
misalignment between FDA approval and market entrance.395 In mid-2018, the
FDA Commissioner noted that, even though the Agency had approved a total of
nine biosimilars, only three were commercially available.396 As thenCommissioner Gottlieb put it, “[i]n some cases, patent thickets on biologics
deter market entry for years after FDA approval.”397
Pay-for-delay agreements between biologic and biosimilar manufacturers
stem from a misarticulation of the leading regulatory regimes governing
biopharmaceutical innovation—the patent system and the FDA regulatory
regime, with antitrust scrutiny lagging in time. That a dysfunctional embodiment
of the innovation ecosystem should allow grantees of FDA licenses to avoid
commercialization through non-use is a perversion of the regulatory regime. In
this context, FDA inaction in the face of non-practicing licensees amounts to a
furtherance of an undesirable distortion to competition.
The different functions performed by the FDA cannot be meaningfully
isolated. While acting as an agency tasked with assessing and monitoring the
safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products, the FDA is also acting as a
catalyst for the production of valuable information, a promoter of public health
and, often, a distorter of competition that grants market access to one
manufacturer while delaying it for others. The competition-distorting role of the
FDA in biopharmaceutical markets is not necessarily a negative thing.398 It is,
first and foremost, a design feature. But this Article posits that, when certain
disfunctions occur—namely, pay-for-delay—this feature should be balanced by
a corrective gesture from the Agency, one that is already built into its regulatory
framework.399 The FDA has long been given statutory power to revoke
licenses.400 The final section of this Article argues that the FDA can use that
power to revoke licenses granted to biosimilar manufacturers who fail to bring
their products to market because of a pay-for-delay agreement. Moreover, the

395
Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Advancing Patient Care Through Competition, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officials/advancing-patientcare-through-competition-04192018.
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
Although, some commentators have questioned whether lengthy exclusivity periods and priority
vouchers really serve the purpose of promoting biopharmaceutical innovation. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-319, RARE DISEASES: TOO EARLY TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS OF FDA’S
PEDIATRIC VOUCHER PROGRAM (2016), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319.
399
See infra Part IV.C.3 (outlining the regulatory framework for the revocation of FDA licenses for
biologics).
400
See 21 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2019).
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FDA should revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-delay, because it is
the best-placed institutional player in this field, as the PTO has limited power to
break through patent thickets and FTC scrutiny offers a direct but protracted
response to anticompetitive behavior in the pharmaceutical arena.
C. Overview of the Proposed Framework
This section proposes an ex post intervention aimed at curbing pay-for-delay
in the context of biologic-biosimilar competition. Specifically, it argues that the
FDA should use its power to revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of unjustified
inaction by biosimilar manufacturers. Such an intervention, designed to occur
on a faster timeline than antitrust scrutiny, functions as a deterrent for
anticompetitive behaviors and creates a signaling mechanism that clears the field
for legitimate competitors to emerge.
1. The Proposed Intervention
In its gatekeeping function, the FDA has the ability to grant licenses to
market certain pharmaceutical drugs. As a general principle of FDA law,
manufacturers of new pharmaceutical drugs, as well as follow-on innovators,401
are barred from bringing unapproved drugs to market, absent a permissive
gesture from the FDA.402 The ability to grant licenses is matched by the
Agency’s ability to revoke licenses, if certain behaviors—or lack thereof—
occur.403
As seen above, certain licenses granted by the FDA cause significant market
distortions.404 This is the case of licenses to market biologic products,
particularly when a biologic is the first of its kind to receive FDA approval and
a statutory exclusivity prevents competitors from entering the market for a
period of twelve years, independent of the patent protection status.
So far, the FDA has been engaging in license revocation primarily while
exercising its gatekeeping role405 in pursuit of its mission of protecting the public
401

This expression encompasses manufacturers of generics drugs and of biosimilars alike.
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (prohibiting the introduction of new drugs into interstate commerce unless the FDA
approves an application); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (subjecting generic drugs to a similar prohibition and to the approval
of an abbreviated application); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (framing the prohibition as “introduc[ing] or
deliver[ing] for introduction into interstate commerce”).
403
21 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2019).
404
See supra Part IV.B.
405
Indirectly, the FDA could do so using its information-producing role. See Enforcement Actions
(CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/compliance-actionsbiologics/enforcement-actions-cber (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
402
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health,406 but it has not done so in connection with its role in distorting
competition.407 This Article argues that the Agency can and should revoke
licenses granted to biosimilar manufacturers when they fail to bring their
products to market within a certain period of time,408 absent a reasonable
justification for the delay—defined to mean circumstances that roughly align
with the concepts of impracticability, impossibility, or force majeure.409
As developed below, this proposal seeks to accomplish four goals. First, it
provides a direct fix for a gamesmanship problem within overlapping regulatory
regimes.410 Second, it seeks to mitigate the consequences411 of a problem that
originates elsewhere in the administrative state, as dozens or hundreds of patents
are awarded to a single biologic, enabling tiered litigation strategies.412 Third, it
creates a signaling feature, as biosimilar manufacturers seeking FDA approval
indicate that they are prepared to either see patent litigation through, or avoid
existing patents altogether—as entering into a settlement with the manufacturer
of the reference biologic will translate into losing their license.413 And fourth, it
restores meaning to the licensing activity of the FDA, which has been stripped
of its intended function, as two-thirds of the first nine biosimilars approved by
the Agency have not entered the market.414
The proposal is confined to cases of pay-for-delay involving biosimilars,
given the particular characteristics of competition in this field, as well as the
costs to patients and health systems affected by the unavailability of biosimilar
alternatives in the U.S. market.415 It is not proposed in lieu of antitrust scrutiny,
but rather as a checkpoint for a specific type of anticompetitive behavior located
outside the core antitrust avenues for patrolling heterogenous anticompetitive
behaviors. And finally, the proposal does not address the larger problems of
406

See What We Do, supra note 394.
See supra Part IV.B.
408
21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2) (2019).
409
See infra Part IV.C.2.
410
See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685,
687 (2009) (defining regulatory gaming as “private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or neutral regulations
and uses them for exclusionary purposes”).
411
See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1485–86 (2015) (listing instances of
direct and indirect action by non-patent agencies, including the FTC and the National Institutes of Health, in
cases involving patent conflicts); see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, How Logically Impossible
Patents Block Biosimilars, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 862 (2019) (discussing drug price increases caused by
monopolization of the market through strategic, excessive patenting of biologics).
412
See supra Part III.A.2.
413
See infra Part IV.C.3.
414
See Biosimilar Product Information, supra note 205; see also infra Appendix 2.
415
See Price & Rai, supra note 411 (discussing drug price increases caused by monopolization of the
market through strategic, excessive patenting of biologics).
407
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regulatory design and interagency coordination of which pharmaceutical payfor-delay agreements take advantage, but provides a localized fix designed to
diminish the frequency and impact of these agreements.
2. Mechanics and Implementation of the Proposal
If subjected to the possibility of license revocation, manufacturers of
biosimilars receiving approval from the FDA would have a certain period of
time to start manufacturing their products and to bring them to market. Past that
period, and absent a reasonable justification, the FDA would take steps to revoke
the biosimilar license.
FDA approval normally marks the last regulatory hurdle to
commercialization of products subject to pre-market review.416 Because of the
distortions to the post-approval timeline that are now pervasive in the case of
biosimilars, this proposal advocates for the determination of a reasonable period
of time for the license grantee to bring the biosimilar to market.417 The semiformalized qualification comes from the fact that this period of time should be
established by FDA guidance, an “informal tool”418 widely used by
administrative agencies. The FDA, like other federal regulatory agencies, uses
guidance “to set policy broadly and prospectively” instead of resorting to formal
rulemaking processes.419 In the case of biosimilar licenses, issuing guidance
would be the most flexible and least cumbersome way for the Agency to
communicate with industry, affording interested parties and the public in general
the possibility of commenting on draft versions.420 Moreover, and if appropriate,
the malleability of guidance would allow the FDA to set different timelines and
specifications for different types of biosimilars, as well as to move from general
timeline parameters to more precise formulations (and vice versa) as needed.
This Article is agnostic as to the specific duration of this period of time. Such
a determination is best left to the regulator with expertise in the field. The
416
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (prohibiting introduction of new drugs into interstate commerce unless the FDA
approves an application); see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.44 (2019) (detailing steps of review of pre-market approval
applications with FDA approval as the final step in process).
417
This idea is consistent with existing regulations, which contemplate a “reasonable” period during which
the manufacturer of a biologic can “demonstrate or achieve compliance” before license revocation. FDA
Licensing Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2) (2019); see also infra Part IV.C.3.
418
Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1841 (2011); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L REV. 397, 398 (2007) (noting that the amount
of guidance issued by federal regulatory agencies is “massive”).
419
Mendelson, supra note 418, at 397.
420
See Guide to Submitting Comments to the FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
patients/guide-submitting-comments-fda (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
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relevant element is that the establishment of a non-arbitrary deadline for
commercialization of an approved biosimilar clearly conveys the expectations
of the Agency to manufacturers. At the same time, it keeps the FDA involved in
the indirect monitoring of competition outcomes: if the clock runs out and no
reasonable justification is provided, then the Agency would revoke the
biosimilar license.
Revocation would occur according to the general administrative rules
governing FDA actions, which are further detailed in the following subsection.
It would nonetheless be possible for a biosimilar manufacturer to show evidence
that a delay is attributable to exogenous circumstances and therefore obtain a
revised deadline from the Agency.421 The FDA has the ability to develop a
framework contemplating “reasonable”422 delays through guidance.423 Because
the manufacturing of biologics is significantly more complex than the
manufacturing of conventional drugs,424 a natural fit for this category would be
unforeseen issues affecting the manufacturing process. Additionally, guidance
could contemplate other factors, ranging from production delays attributable to
third-party actions to force majeure events. Absent a reasonable justification for
the delay, the FDA would proceed to revoke the license.
There are different possible embodiments of this proposal. In its simplest
form, revocation would be a stand-alone measure. The following subsection
makes the case that the FDA currently has the authority to revoke biosimilar
licenses based on the manufacturer’s failure to bring the licensed product to
market.425 In more stringent versions of the proposal, which would require
regulatory or legislative intervention—and which therefore would be more

421
This is consistent with longstanding regulations governing revocation of licenses for biologic products.
These regulations require, inter alia, a “reasonable” notification period during which the manufacturer can
“demonstrate or achieve compliance” with regulatory requirements before the FDA institutes revocation
proceedings. 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2) (2019); see also infra Part IV.C.3 (detailing general administrative rules
governing FDA actions).
422
21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2).
423
Populating the concept of “reasonable” delays via administrative guidance further removes the problem
of having the FDA make a determination as to whether a given behavior amounts to a pay-for-delay settlement
as evaluated under antitrust law principles, channeling FDA’s attention to the existence or absence of problems
that the Agency is well-positioned to evaluate, such as delays attributable to manufacturing or supply chainrelated issues. Guidance Documents (Medical Devices and Radiation-Emitting Products), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/guidancedocuments-medical-devices-and-radiation-emitting-products (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
424
See Price & Rai, supra note 10, at 1033–36 (highlighting path-dependency and unexpected
physiological effects arising in connection with the manufacturing process).
425
This authority is grounded on regulatory language. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii) (2019).
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challenging to implement426—revocation could be coupled with a time ban on
reapplying for a license, or restrictions on data resubmission.
3. The Possibility of License Revocation by the FDA
As an administrative agency, the FDA is subject to general administrative
principles and rules. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) gives agencies
the ability to grant different types of licenses, which are collectively defined as
including “the whole or a part of an agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission.”427 The APA also contemplates several measures that can be taken
by administrative agencies to penalize license holders for certain behaviors.428
These measures range from the imposition of economic sanctions such as
fines429 to the invalidation of previously granted licenses.430
The FDA is also subject to a specific regulatory framework governing the
revocation of licenses. Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which sets
forth the general regulatory framework for FDA-regulated products, addresses
the possibility of license revocation in connection with different scenarios.431
These depend on the product at stake, as well as on the underlying causes of
revocation.
With regard to biologics, the circumstances under which the FDA may
revoke a license fall broadly into four categories.432 First, license revocation may
occur in cases in which the Agency is notified of a manufacturer’s intention to
discontinue the manufacture of all or some of the products covered by a
license.433 Second, the FDA has the authority434 to take steps to revoke a license
426

See infra Part IV.C.5.
5 U.S.C. § 551(8); see also § 551(9) (defining licensing as including “agency process respecting the
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or
conditioning of a license”).
428
See § 558 (subjecting these measures to jurisdictional and procedural limitations).
429
§§ 551(10), 558 (listing the types of sanctions susceptible of being imposed by administrative
agencies).
430
§ 558(c).
431
FDA Licensing Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2019). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 371 (establishing framework
for regulations, hearings, and guidance documents issued by the Agency); FDA Administrative Practices and
Procedures Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 10 (2019) (delineating the general framework for the Agency’s administrative
practices and procedures).
432
See § 601.5 (2019).
433
§ 601.5(a).
434
§ 601.5(b)(1) (framing revocation as mandatory under certain circumstances: “The Commissioner shall
notify the licensed manufacturer of the intention to revoke the biologics license . . . if the Commissioner finds
any of the following”) (emphasis added).
427
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when certain behaviors from the manufacturer effectively undermine the
Agency’s ability to carry out inspections or to monitor changes affecting
licensed products.435 Third, the Agency has the authority to revoke a license in
connection with material violations of licensing standards, a category that
includes significant changes involving a licensed product, methods of
manufacturing or the manufacturing establishment, or notification failures.436
Lastly, license revocation may also occur when the licensed product can no
longer be considered safe or efficacious or is deemed misbranded.437
The regulations further establish the procedural framework for revocation of
FDA licenses, which impose several obligations on the Agency, from
notification and hearing requirements438 to the concession of a “reasonable
period” for manufacturers to demonstrate compliance or bring their practices
into compliance.439
In cases of pay-for-delay, licensure is followed by prolonged inaction on the
part of the biosimilar manufacturer. From an administrative policy perspective,
this behavior is undesirable, as it frustrates the purpose for which the license was
granted while displacing resources within an agency. In the case of the FDA, the
failure to bring an approved biosimilar to market additionally weakens the
catalyzing role of the Agency in the production of information. A normal
licensure procedure culminates in the commercialization of a biopharmaceutical
drug, maintaining the flow of data production as the drug is monitored
throughout the post-market stage through surveillance studies and reporting
requirements. Under pay-for-delay, that flow is broken. The permission granted
by the FDA is not reciprocated by continued production of data, but rather
followed by stagnating levels of information about the approved product.
Adding to this problem, the outcome of the licensure process is at odds with the
time and resources allocated by the FDA during the review process: the FDA
grants a permission that is not acted upon. For an agency that has recently made
some important strides in diminishing application backlog, and which can easily
be affected by external constraints,440 the mismatch between the resource
allocation and frustrated market entrance is not insignificant.
435

§ 601.5(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
§ 601.5(b)(1)(iii)–(iv).
437
§ 601.5(b)(1)(v)–(vi) (including cases in which changes affecting the licensed product are so
substantial that a new regulatory review is needed).
438
§ 601.5(b)(1).
439
§ 601.5(b)(2).
440
See, e.g., Alexander Gaffney, Post-Shutdown, FDA Faces Backlog of Work, PWC (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200628105154/https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/health-industries/library/
fda-post-shutdown-backlog-2-1-19.html (noting the impact of the 2019 government shutdown on the Agency’s
436
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The language of the revocation provisions in the Code of Federal
Regulations can be used to support the view that the FDA can revoke a license
due to inaction on the part of the biosimilar manufacturer, coupled with the
ensuing lack of information generated about an FDA-approved product. 21
C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii) authorizes the FDA to initiate proceedings to revoke a
biologics license when “[m]anufacturing of products or of a product has been
discontinued to an extent that a meaningful inspection or evaluation cannot be
made.”441 This provision is one of several in which license revocation constitutes
a remedy to manufacturing insufficiencies. Section 601.5(b)(1)(ii) specifically
addresses cases in which manufacturing activity has been reduced to
inordinately low levels, which consequently and similarly decreases the
production of information about the licensed product.442 The unusual and quasioxymoronic word choice—”discontinued to an extent”443—seems to indicate
that the law is contemplating situations in which manufacturing outputs are
virtually zero. Discontinued production is a different concept from very low
levels of production,444 but the language appears to imply the admissibility of a
range of discontinuation—or, more properly, of reduced levels of production—
for which license revocation becomes the remedy if production does not rise to
meaningful levels.445 As such, the language indicates that the primary concern
of the regulator is to avoid situations in which manufacturing for the United
States market of an FDA-approved biologic falls to zero, or to levels that are
materially equivalent to zero.
The framing provision in section 601.5(b)(1), to which the discontinuation
provision is subject, states that the Agency “shall notify the licensed
manufacturer of the intention to revoke the biologics license.”446 The enabling
language in this section is thus mandatory. Not only can the FDA revoke licenses
in situations within the purview of section 601.5(b)(1)(ii), it should do so.
The articulation of these two provisions provides a framework through
which the Agency addresses situations of inexistent or quasi-inexistent
manufacturing levels. If the regulator mandates license revocation in cases in
review timeline).
441
21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii).
442
Id.
443
Id.
444
Common definitions of “discontinue” equate it with “1: to break the continuity of: cease to operate,
administer, use, produce, or take[;] 2: to abandon or terminate . . . .” Discontinue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discontinue (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
445
Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2) (giving manufacturers a “reasonable period” to “demonstrate or achieve
compliance”).
446
Id.
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which manufacturing levels are close to “discontinuation,” then the revocation
framework has to contemplate cases in which manufacturing levels are zero or
have never risen above zero. A logical interpretive principle of a maiore ad
minus should apply here: if the law has a punitive gesture toward levels of
productions that are materially equivalent to zero, then it must also encompass
situations in which manufacturing levels have never been greater than zero.
What happens in situations of pay-for-delay falls squarely under this framework:
inaction at the manufacturing level, with consequent unavailability of the FDAapproved product in the market, in disregard of the licensure process.
A contextual analysis further enhances this reading. The interpretation of the
regulations offered above is consistent with the spirit of section 601.5(a), which
mandates license revocation—“[a] biologics license shall be revoked”—
whenever the manufacturer of an approved biologic notifies the FDA of its
intention to discontinue production of an approved product.447 If a manufacturer
chooses (or is forced) to bring levels of production down to zero, the justification
for the maintenance of the license ceases to exist.
In addition to establishing the framework for license revocation, it is worth
noting that section 601.5 also contains a balancing mechanism, giving
manufacturers the opportunity to bring production levels to a meaningful
threshold within a “reasonable period” of time.448 The proposal outlined in the
previous section of this Article put forward an explicit embodiment of this
requirement,449 developed through guidance.450
The FDA should thus revoke the licenses of biosimilar manufacturers
engaging in pay-for-delay after a reasonable period of time. If applied properly,
the existing regulatory framework should have resulted in the revocation of the
licenses of Humira competitors who gained FDA approval but failed to
manufacture the approved biosimilar,451 or in a nudge toward compliance with
manufacturing requirements.452

447

§ 601.5(a).
§ 601.5(b)(2).
449
But see id. (establishing the same “in cases involving willfulness”); § 601.6(a) (establishing that the
“reasonable period” period requirement ceases to apply in cases in which the Agency reasonably believes that
the public health is being harmed).
450
See supra Part IV.C.2.
451
The existence of a pay-for-delay agreement should constitute prima facie evidence of violation of the
conduct required by 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii) (“Manufacturing of products . . . discontinued to an extent that
a meaningful inspection or evaluation cannot be made.”); § 601.5(b)(2) (stating that manufacturers must achieve
compliance with FDA requirements or face license revocation).
452
See Part IV.C.5 for a further exploration of the advantages of license removal as a nudge mechanism.
448
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4. Advantages of the Proposal
In addition to applying the existing legal framework for license revocation
in a manner that is consistent with linguistic and teleological interpretive
principles, the proposal outlined above serves several other goals.
First, it constitutes an indirect but more timely response to anticompetitive
behaviors than the one normally provided by institutions that directly monitor
antitrust issues. Consider, for instance, the case of Amgen, the first biosimilar
company to settle with AbbVie.453 The FDA approved Amgen’s biosimilar in
September 2016, just over three months before the expiration of Humira’s
composition patent.454 The pay-for-delay settlement took place in September
2017.455 As of early 2020, Amgen’s license is still valid, even though no
manufacturing for the United States market has occurred.456 Now imagine that
the reasonable period granted by the FDA was one year, counted from January 1,
2017.457 Assuming no significant hurdles to manufacturing during that period,458
license revocation would have occurred in early 2018. Even if, for the sake of
argument, the reasonable period was fixed at two years, revocation would occur
in early 2019, months before the beginning of the antitrust response. Even
though these dates are artificial, they illustrate the ability of the FDA to address,
albeit indirectly, a competition-related problem. License revocation is a nimbler
tool than direct antitrust responses to pay-for-delay.
The second advantage of the solution proposed in this Article is its signaling
function. Were the FDA to apply the existing revocation framework to pay-fordelay, a biosimilar company seeking regulatory approval would be signaling to
competitors its intention to see the licensure process through. This signal would
be especially meaningful in the case of patent challenges, as it would indicate
confidence in the probability of success. Moreover, in versions of the proposal

453

See infra Appendix 2.
See infra Appendix 2.
455
See infra Appendix 2.
456
See BLA License 761024, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=761024 (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (noting the validity of
Amgen’s license); Biosimilar Product Information, supra note 205 (listing biosimilars for Humira).
457
This would be the first day after the expiration of the composition patent on Humira, for the sake of
simplicity.
458
There have not been any hurdles in the manufacturing of the biosimilar for the European market. See
AbbVie’s International Humira Revenues Drop 33.5% After Biosimilar Competition, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/abbvies-international-humira-revenues-drop-335after-biosimilar-competition (noting Humira biosimilar market entrance in Europe shortly after regulatory
approval).
454
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encompassing additional measures—such as a temporal ban on reapplication for
a license—the signaling function would be even stronger.
As the following subsection acknowledges, license revocation may have a
chilling effect on the number of biosimilar manufacturers seeking FDA
approval, particularly when several secondary patents on a biologic are valid or
have yet to be invalidated. But the third effect of the proposal is that it may nudge
some biosimilar manufacturers to channel resources toward challenging weak
patents in the biopharmaceutical space. While the overall number of biosimilar
manufacturers seeking market entrance may be smaller under the threat of
license revocation, the number of follow-on competitors needed on the market
for prices to drop is actually fairly small.459 As further detailed below, market
saturation happens quickly in this field,460 and, therefore, even if the overall
number of potential market entrants is lower under the proposed framework, the
number of manufacturers who need to be able to navigate R&D, regulatory
review, and potential patent litigation will remain very low. At the same time,
the economic return available for those few who succeed in entering the market
is not negligible. As such, even if the proposal may lead to a certain degree of
R&D attrition, the economic incentive to come to market is not displaced.
License revocation eliminates pay-for-delay and clears the field for highly
motivated players to seek product commercialization, potentially even sooner
than under current practices.
Finally, another advantage of this proposal is that it restores meaning to the
licensing activity of the FDA. By leaving manufacturing inaction unpenalized
in the short term, an empty space at the intersection of different branches of the
law allows companies to seek and obtain FDA approval without any intention
of entering the market for years.461 As such, FDA licensure is reduced to an
empty gesture. For an agency that is now staunchly embedded in
biopharmaceutical innovation policy, this is especially problematic.
5. Drawbacks of the Proposal
A feature of this proposal is that it specifically targets only one of the parties
engaging in anticompetitive behavior. If implemented, were a Humira-type deal
to occur, AbbVie would not be directly affected by the intervention of the FDA,
whereas Amgen and any other biosimilar companies entering into pay-for-delay
459

See Davio, supra note 42.
See infra Part IV.C.5.
461
See supra Part III (describing licensure of biosimilars to Humira in cases in which the sponsor of the
biosimilar had previously entered into an anticompetitive agreement with Humira’s manufacturer).
460
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agreements would. In stronger versions of the proposal, there is a punitive
element added to license revocation—for instance, in the form of a temporal ban
on seeking regulatory approval—that further renders the proposal harsher
toward follow-on competitors.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that even stronger versions of the
proposal target biosimilar manufacturers only if and because their status
switches from would-be competitors to gamers of the regulatory system. While
a symmetrical framework would be formally fairer in absolute terms, it would
be impracticable from the perspective of co-involving the FDA in addressing
pay-for-delay. License revocation grounded in manufacturer inaction does not
apply to the first-comer to market, but to follow-on innovators who fail to
compete. AbbVie’s behavior is problematic from different angles, chief among
which is antitrust law, but not in terms of meeting the manufacturing
requirements that attach to the grant of an FDA license. Beyond this technical
aspect, as a matter of policy, the goal of the proposal is to bring follow-on
products to market sooner, not to diminish the influx of life-changing and lifesavings drugs to market. Moreover, and as a balancing mechanism, the party not
targeted by the FDA intervention under the proposed framework is not exempted
from legal scrutiny: it merely happens at a different time and through the lens of
a different branch of the law.
A different type of objection to the proposal relates to the political economy.
As Daniel Carpenter has recently observed, the FDA operates within “an
inescapably political world.”462 In terms of implementation, the previous
subsection delineated a pathway for application of the existing license
revocation framework to pay-for-delay. In its most straightforward form, the
proposal does not require legislative intervention and is entirely FDAadministered. But legislative action would likely be required to adopt more
expansive forms of the proposal. Given that topics related to biopharmaceuticals
are at the center of some of the most politically charged debates in the United
States, this is not a trivial drawback. While this issue does not present itself
solely in connection with this proposal, it certainly decreases the likelihood that
stronger versions of the proposal will be adopted. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that currently there are efforts across the political spectrum supporting a variety
of measures aimed at lowering the price of prescription drugs.463 As a tool to
462
Daniel Carpenter, FDA Transparency in an Inescapable Political World, 45 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 29,
32 (2017).
463
See, e.g., Susan Cornwell & Michael Erman, Senators Announce Bipartisan Proposal to Lower Drug
Prices, REUTERS (July 23, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drugpricing/u-s-senatorsannounce-bipartisan-proposal-to-lower-drug-prices-idUSKCN1UI1WS; Michael Erman & Carl O’Donnell,
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bring biosimilars to market faster, even stronger versions of the license
revocation proposal are consistent with these goals, despite the need for changes
to the law and regulations.
Another dimension of the political economy is that the FDA derives a
substantial amount of its funding from industry. In fiscal year 2019, for example,
the overall budget of the Agency was $5.7 billion, of which 55% ($3.1 billion)
was derived from federal budget authorization and 45% ($2.6 billion) came from
industry user fees.464 While being mindful of this feature and of the fact that the
FDA interacts constantly with industry,465 the proposal does not fundamentally
upend the FDA-industry relationship. Instead, its core advocates for the
application of existing law. As a by-product, a relatively small number of firms
would be affected by license revocation or the threat thereof.466 From this
perspective, the proposal might be more palatable to the pharmaceutical industry
as a whole than at first blush. Additionally, and more importantly, disruption of
the status quo should not be a valid justification for the Agency to shy away
from fulfilling its role in license revocation, or for possible legislative changes
to be summarily discounted.
Finally, revisiting the problem of chilling effects outlined in the previous
subsection, it is entirely possible that fewer biosimilar companies would seek
regulatory approval under a system in which license revocation looms as a
response to pay-for-delay. Nevertheless, given the size of the market for
biologics, the incentive to become the second or third market entrant remains in
place. In fact, given the costs associated with developing and manufacturing
biosimilar products, one of the early lessons in the economics of biosimilar
competition has been that the number of follow-on innovators able to enter the
market until returns become sub-competitive is small. Once again, the case of
Exclusive: White House Preparing Order That Would Cut Drug Prices for Medicare, REUTERS (July 24, 2019,
6:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drugpricing-exclusive/exclusive-white-house-preparingorder-that-would-cut-drug-prices-for-medicare-sources-idUSKCN1UJ354; Susan Cornwell, U.S. Speaker
Pelosi Unveils Drug Price Plan, Trump Welcomes It, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2019, 9:10 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-congress-pelosi/u-s-speaker-pelosi-unveils-drug-price-plan-trumpwelcomes-it-idUSKBN1W41QU. It is also worth noting that the FTC supports legislation to curb pay-for-delay.
See Pay-For-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.
gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
464
FDA at a Glance, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/fact-sheetfda-glance (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
465
Robert M. Califf, Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 45 J.L., MED. & ETHICS
24, 24–25 (2017).
466
One of the consequences of the asymmetrical nature of the proposal is that there would also be less
disruption of the status quo for big pharma than under other proposals targeting anticompetitive behaviors or
high costs of prescription drugs.
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Humira illustrates this point: between September 2017 and May 2019, nine
biosimilar companies entered into pay-for-delay agreements with AbbVie;467 in
August 2019, Momenta, a company that was developing a biosimilar to Humira,
announced that it would stop R&D on the project and reallocate around $100
million to the development of a different biosimilar.468 The company explicitly
credited market saturation in the Humira biosimilar space as one of the main
reasons for the switch.469 Against this backdrop, while the proposed FDA
intervention would diminish competition from a quantitative perspective, the
possibility of tapping into multi-million dollar revenue streams should be
sufficient to preserve enough economic incentives for a limited number of
follow-on firms to seek market entrance.
Throughout its evolution as a public health-oriented agency, the FDA has
acquired innovation-promoting and competition-distorting power, while
retaining its mission of promoting and maintaining the public health.470 A
solution that preserves the goal of bringing motivated biosimilar manufacturers
to come to market—and, as a consequence, the indirect goal of lowering prices
of the most promising and expensive drugs available to patients—is ultimately
consistent with these goals.
CONCLUSION
As the world’s most expensive—and most needed—drugs begin losing
patent protection in the United States, one would expect cheaper versions of
these drugs to become available to patients. Yet, as seen above, that has not been
the case, even when fully developed biosimilars have received FDA market
approval.
In addition to the behavior of private firms, exemplified above by the Humira
case study, several imbalances rooted in seemingly unrelated parts of the
administrative state contribute to this scenario. From the likely excessive
number of patents issued by the PTO covering a single drug, to the temporal lag
problem inherent, to antitrust scrutiny, it has been relatively easy for
anticompetitive behaviors to proliferate and remain unchecked for extended

467

See infra Appendix 2.
See Davio, supra note 42.
469
See Momenta Drops Humira Biosimilar Development, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Aug. 30,
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periods of time, with potentially devastating consequences for the health of
patients and at onerous costs to health systems.
This Article has identified a new institutional locus for more timely
interventions seeking to address these types of anticompetitive behaviors. As a
pre-market gatekeeper with post-market monitoring functions, as well as in its
role as a catalyst for the production of information, the FDA is well-positioned
to both penalize and disincentivize gamesmanship of the regulatory system in
the area of biologic-biosimilar competition, while clearing the pathway for
motivated players to bring cheaper drugs to market. This Article has further
argued that the proposed solution—license revocation—is already supported by
existing regulatory language, even if not by agency practice. Alternative
embodiments of a license revocation-based scheme are also possible, including
interventions by regulators or legislators that would direct the Agency to start
applying the existing revocation provisions to ongoing cases.
Finally, and beyond features which are specific to the field of
biopharmaceutical products, this Article has sought to call attention to a lessexplored dimension of FDA activity: in addition to its canonical functions, the
FDA should also be understood as a distorter of competition, as illustrated by
the multiple market exclusivity regimes it operates and its priority voucher
program. When considered in this light, the Agency should not be discounted as
a possible player in the search for responses to competition-driven problems—a
topic with larger ramifications across legal regimes worth exploring in future
scholarly dialogue.
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APPENDIX 1
Humira’s Patent Estate

Table 1: Adapted from RICHARD GONZALEZ, ABBVIE, ABBVIE LONG-TERM
STRATEGY (Oct. 30, 2015).

APPENDIX 2
Chronology of Settlements between AbbVie and Biosimilar Companies
Biosimilar Company

Settlement Agreed Entry Date Biosimilar FDA
Date
(U.S.)
Approval
Amgen
9/28/2017
1/31/2023
9/23/2016
Samsung Bioepis
4/5/2018
6/30/2023
7/23/2019
Mylan
7/17/2018
7/31/2023
NA
Sandoz
10/11/2018
9/30/2023
10/31/2018
Fresenius Kabi
10/17/2018
9/30/2023
NA
Momenta
11/6/2018
11/20/2023
NA
Pfizer
11/30/2018
11/20/2023
NA
Coherus
1/25/2019
12/15/2023
NA
Boehringer Ingelheim
5/14/2019
7/1/2023
8/25/2017
Table 2: Adapted from Zachary Brennan, Six Lawsuits Target AbbVie’s Humira
and Its Patent Thicket, RAPS (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-andarticles/news-articles/2019/4/six-lawsuits-target-abbvies-humira-and-its-patent.

